Monell and Municipal Liability Cases

Winegarner v. City of Irving

No. 3:24-CV-02171-K-BT (N.D. Tex. 2025) · Aug 20, 2025

Magistrate Judge recommended granting all motions to dismiss: Irving Police Department dismissed as a non-suable entity; City of Irving's Monell liability claims dismissed for failure to identify a specific policy, custom, or training failure; officers' qualified immunity defense sustained on excessive force, wrongful arrest, and malicious prosecution claims; Title VI claim dismissed for failure to allege intentional discrimination.

Young v. City of Irving

No. 3:23-CV-1423-D (N.D. Tex. 2024) · Sep 12, 2024

Granted motions to dismiss pro se plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the City of Irving and police officers but granted leave to replead; held that video evidence contradicting the plaintiff's allegations of unlawful arrest and excessive force entitled officers to qualified immunity, and that municipal liability claims based on conclusory allegations of policy or custom failed.

Barrera v. City of Irving

No. 3:24-CV-0177 (N.D. Tex.) · Jan 25, 2024

Pending civil rights action alleging excessive force and municipal liability against the City of Irving and its officers.

Hodge v. Engleman

90 F.4th 840 (5th Cir. 2024) · Jan 16, 2024

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity for fatally shooting a man who exited his car with a gun and pointed it at an officer after a brief pursuit, where bodycam footage blatantly contradicted the plaintiff's allegations; the court treated the district court's consideration of video evidence on a 12(b)(6) motion as an implicit conversion to summary judgment.

Sligh v. City of Conroe

No. 22-40518 (5th Cir. 2023) · Nov 21, 2023

While siccing a police dog on a suicidal woman who was not suspected of any crime and posed no threat to officers constituted excessive force, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established under the specific circumstances, which involved active resistance followed by unintentionally prolonged canine force.

Zavala v. Harris County

No. 22-20611 (5th Cir. 2023) · Nov 21, 2023

Affirmed dismissal of Monell claims against Harris County and grant of qualified immunity to a jailer on excessive force claims arising from use of hog-tie restraints on a pretrial detainee, holding that the use of hog-ties was not clearly established as unconstitutional where the detainee exhibited disorderly and self-injurious behavior.

Spiller v. Harris County

No. 22-20123 (5th Cir. 2023) · Jan 1, 2023

Reaffirmed that employees of the same legal entity cannot conspire among themselves under § 1983 and that municipal liability requires identification of an official policy or custom, not merely individual officer misconduct.

Buehler v. Dear

No. 20-50822 (5th Cir. 2022) · Mar 3, 2022

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on a police-accountability activist's false arrest and excessive force claims arising from his arrest while filming police on a crowded street, but genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on certain excessive force claims.

Spiller v. Harris County, Texas

No. 21-20574 (5th Cir. 2022) · Jan 1, 2022

Employees of the same municipal entity cannot conspire among themselves for purposes of a § 1983 conspiracy claim because a single legal entity cannot conspire with itself.

Harmon v. City of Arlington

16 F.4th 1159 (5th Cir. 2021) · Oct 26, 2021

An officer who fatally shot a driver while clinging to the side of the driver's fleeing SUV was entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably perceived a threat of serious physical harm, and plaintiffs failed to identify clearly established law prohibiting deadly force under those specific circumstances.

Maxwell v. Mesquite ISD

No. 3:20-CV-3581-S (N.D. Tex.) · Sep 19, 2021

A school district employee's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim was dismissed where the plaintiff failed to adequately allege an official policy or custom that caused the violation, and failed to plead the content of his social media posts to establish they addressed a matter of public concern.

Hutcheson v. Dallas County

No. 20-10383 (5th Cir. 2021) · Apr 12, 2021

Officers who restrained a man under the influence of drugs were entitled to qualified immunity where their conduct did not violate clearly established law, and a single incident was insufficient to establish failure-to-train liability.

Brown v. Tarrant County

No. 19-10594 (5th Cir. 2021) · Jan 18, 2021

A civilly committed sexually violent predator's § 1983 claims against a county and its sheriff for failure to provide sex offender treatment during a twenty-day jail confinement were properly dismissed where the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity and no municipal liability claim was stated.

Kostic v. Texas A&M University at Commerce

No. 3:19-CV-2865 (N.D. Tex.) · Jun 15, 2020

A university employee's due process and First Amendment claims were dismissed where she failed to allege facts sufficient to overcome the university's Eleventh Amendment immunity and failed to identify a final policymaker for Monell liability purposes.

Sanchez v. Young County

956 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2020) · Apr 22, 2020

Summary judgment for the county on a conditions-of-confinement claim was reversed where evidence showed the jail had a persistent pattern of failing to complete mandatory intake screenings, and a pretrial detainee died of a drug overdose after jailers put her in a cell to 'sleep it off' without completing suicide screening or medical intake forms.

Ratliff v. Aransas County

948 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2020) · Jan 15, 2020

Deputies were entitled to qualified immunity where they shot a man five times after he refused to drop a loaded pistol during a domestic violence call, despite his later acquittal on criminal charges.

Westfall v. Luna

903 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2018) · Sep 13, 2018

Reversed summary judgment on false arrest claims where fact issues existed on probable cause; affirmed qualified immunity on excessive force (de minimis injury from assisting officer), First Amendment retaliation (force motivated by conduct not speech), denial of medical treatment (45-minute delay not deliberately indifferent), and failure to train claims against the City.

Miranda v. County of Lake

900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) · Aug 10, 2018

The court clarified the standard for municipal liability under Monell, holding that a county could be liable under § 1983 for maintaining a widespread practice of excessive force where the practice was so pervasive that it constituted a de facto policy, and that private medical providers contracted by the county could not be shielded from § 1983 liability simply because they were not government employees.

Littell v. Houston Independent School District

894 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2018) · Jun 27, 2018

A school district's complete failure to provide Fourth Amendment training to employees who conduct student searches plausibly states a failure-to-train claim under § 1983, even without a pattern of prior violations.

Skyy v. City of Arlington

No. 17-10529 (5th Cir. 2017) · Nov 9, 2017

Pro se plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the city were dismissed because they relied on a respondeat superior theory—that city officers violated city personnel manual policies—rather than identifying a municipal policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations.

White v. Jackson

865 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2017) · Aug 1, 2017

The Eighth Circuit addressed § 1983 claims arising from the Ferguson, Missouri protests, holding that officers who used excessive force against protesters — including tear gas and rubber bullets against non-violent demonstrators — could be held liable, while also analyzing qualified immunity and municipal liability under Monell.

Vincent v. City of Sulphur

No. 15-30182 (5th Cir. 2015) · Oct 28, 2015

Reversed denial of qualified immunity on procedural due process and municipal liability claims arising from a no-trespass order prohibiting a citizen from entering city-owned property, holding that the law regarding due process requirements for such orders was not clearly established.

Culbertson v. Lykos

790 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2015) · Jun 22, 2015

Former crime lab employees stated a plausible § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Harris County based on the Commissioners Court's ratification of the district attorney's alleged retaliatory campaign, but the assistant district attorney was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that a non-final-decision-maker could be individually liable for a recommendation leading to adverse action.

Wafer v. Molina

No. 3:14-CV-0976-M-BH (N.D. Tex. 2014) · Jun 13, 2014

Recommended dismissal of § 1983 false arrest and unlawful detention claims as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), holding that official-capacity claims against officers are treated as claims against the municipality, that police departments are not suable entities, and that a county jail is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

Pagan-Negron v. Seguin Independent School District

No. SA-12-CV-055-XR (W.D. Tex. 2013) · Sep 24, 2013

A school district was entitled to summary judgment on claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) where the parent participated in the ARD process and the district provided appropriate educational services.

Ramirez v. Martinez

716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013) · May 15, 2013

A deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims where he tased a business owner twice — including once while the owner was handcuffed and lying face-down — during an encounter at the owner's own business; but the deputy had arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Hicks v. Stahl

No. 3:11-CV-02703-P (N.D. Tex. 2012) · Nov 13, 2012

All claims dismissed with prejudice: § 1983 claims against the City of Irving failed for lack of an identified policy, custom, or policymaker under Monell; § 1983 claims against the officers were barred by Heck v. Humphrey because plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction had not been reversed; state law claims against the City were barred by sovereign immunity, and state law claims against the officers were barred by the TTCA election-of-remedies provision.

Swilley v. City of Houston

457 F. App'x 400 (5th Cir. 2012) · Jan 1, 2012

Employees of the same legal entity cannot conspire among themselves under § 1983; the City of Houston is a single legal entity and its employees cannot form a conspiracy as a matter of law.

Connick v. Thompson

563 U.S. 51 (2011) · Mar 29, 2011

A district attorney's office may not be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train prosecutors based on a single Brady violation — absent a pattern of similar violations, a single incident is generally insufficient to prove deliberate indifference.

Carnaby v. City of Houston

636 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2011) · Mar 22, 2011

Summary judgment was properly granted for the City of Houston and its officers in a § 1983 excessive force case arising from a fatal police shooting where the decedent fled from a traffic stop, led police on a high-speed chase, and was armed.

Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls

614 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2010) · Aug 9, 2010

Affirmed summary judgment for the City where the police chief was found to be a policymaker but the plaintiff failed to establish a custom or policy of unconstitutional plain-view seizures; articulated standards for failure-to-train liability requiring specificity about how the training program was defective.

Peterson v. City of Fort Worth

588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009) · Nov 17, 2009

Even where officers may have used excessive force during an arrest, the plaintiff cannot recover against the municipality under Monell without proving that a city policy, practice, or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Deville v. Marcantel

567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009) · May 1, 2009

The Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment for officers on false arrest and excessive force claims arising from a traffic stop where evidence showed the officer may have lacked probable cause for speeding and used disproportionate force to extract a passively resisting woman from her car, but affirmed dismissal of municipal liability claims.

Graham v. City of Irving

No. 3:07-CV-0834-D (N.D. Tex.) · Sep 30, 2008

In a § 1983 excessive force case, the plaintiff must show (1) an injury (2) resulting directly from clearly excessive force (3) the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable; the city cannot be liable under Monell absent a policy or custom that was the moving force behind the violation.

Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park

486 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2007) · May 18, 2007

The Eighth Circuit held that an officer's decision to release a police dog to bite and hold a suspect who was not actively resisting or fleeing constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, and that qualified immunity did not protect the officer because the unlawfulness of the conduct was clearly established.

Palo ex rel. Estate of Palo v. Dallas County

No. 3:05-CV-0527-D (N.D. Tex. 2006) · Dec 15, 2006

A pretrial detainee's estate could proceed to trial on a Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim where the county jail failed to provide adequate medical care to a detainee with serious medical conditions, resulting in his death.

Lawrence v. Kenosha County

391 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2004) · Dec 2, 2004

The Seventh Circuit held that an officer's use of a chokehold and other physical force against a compliant arrestee was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that qualified immunity did not protect the officer because the right to be free from gratuitous force was clearly established.

Kopec v. Tate

361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004) · Mar 17, 2004

An officer who used excessive force during a traffic stop—including slamming a motorist's head into a car and choking him—was not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from gratuitous force against a non-resisting person during a seizure was clearly established, and the municipality could be liable under Monell where the officer's pattern of complaints was known to supervisors.

Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford

361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004) · Mar 15, 2004

The Second Circuit addressed the statute of limitations for § 1983 excessive force claims brought as a class action, holding that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred where they failed to file within the applicable limitations period. The court also examined Monell municipal liability and the standards for bringing class-wide excessive force claims against a police department.

Burge v. St. Tammany Parish

336 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2003) · Jun 25, 2003

The Fifth Circuit reversed a § 1983 judgment against a sheriff in his official capacity for depriving a criminal defendant of his right to a fair trial through spoliation of evidence, finding the evidence insufficient to establish the constitutional violation.

Pineda v. City of Houston

291 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002) · May 9, 2002

A municipality was not liable under Monell for an unconstitutional warrantless entry and fatal shooting by officers on a gang task force, where the plaintiffs failed to show a city policy or custom was the moving force behind the officers' decision to enter the home without a warrant.

Keenan v. Tejeda

290 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2002) · Apr 23, 2002

Citizens who reported a constable's wrongdoing and were then subjected to a retaliatory felony traffic stop and prosecution stated a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, and fact questions precluded qualified immunity.

Piotrowski v. City of Houston

237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001) · Jan 8, 2001

To establish Monell liability in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff must show: (1) an official policy or widespread practice constituting a 'custom'; (2) a policymaker who can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge of the custom; and (3) a constitutional violation whose 'moving force' was the policy or custom.

Brown v. Bryan County (On Remand)

219 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2000) · Jul 18, 2000

On remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the jury's verdict against the county could be sustained under the Supreme Court's heightened deliberate-indifference standard for single-hiring-decision municipal liability.

Smith v. Brenoettsy

No. 97-30587 (5th Cir. 1998) · Nov 5, 1998

An interlocutory appeal from denial of qualified immunity to a prison warden on a failure-to-supervise claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the warden raised only factual disputes—not separable legal issues—regarding whether he acted with deliberate indifference after receiving letters warning him of a guard's threats.

Benningfield v. City of Houston

157 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1998) · Oct 6, 1998

A plaintiff pursuing a municipal liability claim based on failure to train must demonstrate a pattern of similar violations to establish deliberate indifference, and a single incident of excessive force is generally insufficient to prove a municipal custom or policy.

Snyder v. Trepagnier

142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998) · May 8, 1998

The city was not liable under Monell for the shooting of a fleeing suspect because the plaintiff failed to establish deliberate indifference or a causal link between the city's hiring, screening, or stress management policies and the constitutional violation; the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the jury could reconcile findings of excessive force and qualified immunity based on the officer's reasonable but mistaken belief the suspect was armed.

Barney v. Pulsipher

143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998) · May 1, 1998

The Tenth Circuit established the framework for supervisory liability under § 1983, holding that a supervisor can be held personally liable when there is an affirmative link between the supervisor's conduct and the constitutional violation. The court articulated that liability requires the supervisor to have had actual or constructive knowledge of a risk of constitutional harm and to have failed to act to prevent it.

Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown

520 U.S. 397 (1997) · Apr 28, 1997

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a single hiring decision unless the plaintiff demonstrates that adequate screening of the applicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of hiring that applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's constitutional rights.

Baker v. Putnal

75 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1996) · Feb 15, 1996

Summary judgment was improperly granted on an excessive force claim where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether a police officer's shooting of an unarmed man was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Eugene v. Alief Independent School District

65 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1995) · Oct 6, 1995

Malicious prosecution, false arrest, and bodily harm are actionable under § 1983 as Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations; a school district cannot be liable under Monell absent evidence of an official policy or custom causing the violation.

Roberts v. City of Forest Acres

902 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.C. 1995) · Aug 21, 1995

The court denied summary judgment for the city and officer on excessive force and municipal liability claims where evidence showed an officer used force significantly disproportionate to the threat posed during a traffic stop, and the city had inadequate training and supervision of its officers regarding use of force.

Campbell v. City of San Antonio

43 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1995) · Jan 19, 1995

A plaintiff's § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims were properly dismissed where the detective had probable cause based on identification procedures, even though the plaintiff was ultimately innocent and was a victim of mistaken identity.

Babb v. Dorman

33 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994) · Sep 19, 1994

An officer who had arguable probable cause to arrest a motorist for public intoxication was entitled to qualified immunity, and the city was not liable under Monell absent evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Grossman v. City of Portland

33 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1994) · Sep 6, 1994

The Ninth Circuit held that a police officer who used excessive force during an encounter with a citizen was not entitled to qualified immunity, and that the City of Portland could be held liable under Monell if its policies or customs contributed to the constitutional violation. The court clarified the standards for municipal liability and individual officer liability in excessive force cases.

Shaw v. Stroud

13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994) · Jan 6, 1994

A police supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 for a subordinate's use of excessive force where the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of a pervasive pattern of misconduct, was deliberately indifferent to the risk, and there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the constitutional injury.

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit

507 U.S. 163 (1993) · Mar 3, 1993

Federal courts may not apply a heightened pleading standard to § 1983 claims alleging municipal liability — the ordinary notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule 8(a)(2) apply.

Fraire v. City of Arlington

957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992) · Apr 10, 1992

A plainclothes officer who shot and killed a fleeing DWI suspect was entitled to qualified immunity where the suspect drove his truck at the officer, and the city was not liable under Monell absent specific evidence of a policy or custom causing the violation.

Jett v. Dallas Independent School District

491 U.S. 701 (1989) · Jun 22, 1989

Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for violations of rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is against a state actor, and a municipality cannot be held liable under respondeat superior for § 1981 violations.

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police

491 U.S. 58 (1989) · Jun 15, 1989

Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacity are 'persons' under § 1983 — meaning § 1983 cannot be used to sue states or state officials in their official capacity for money damages.

City of Canton v. Harris

489 U.S. 378 (1989) · Feb 28, 1989

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 for failing to train its employees when the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons the employees encounter.

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik

485 U.S. 112 (1988) · Mar 2, 1988

Identifying which officials have 'final policymaking authority' for Monell purposes is a question of state and local law to be decided by the court — not a question of fact for the jury — and merely going along with a subordinate's decisions does not constitute delegation of policymaking authority.

Kentucky v. Graham

473 U.S. 159 (1985) · Jun 28, 1985

Personal-capacity suits seek to hold an officer personally liable; official-capacity suits are really suits against the government entity itself — and fee liability under § 1988 runs with merits liability, not against non-parties.

Bennett v. City of Slidell

735 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1984) · Jul 9, 1984

A municipality is liable under § 1983 only for deprivations inflicted pursuant to official policy—either an officially adopted policy or a persistent, widespread practice so common as to constitute a custom with actual or constructive knowledge attributable to the governing body or a delegated policymaker.

McKinley v. City of Eloy

705 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1983) · May 9, 1983

The Ninth Circuit held that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 for inadequate police training and supervision that amounts to deliberate indifference, and that officers' use of deadly force was constitutionally excessive where the suspect did not pose an immediate threat.

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.

453 U.S. 247 (1981) · Jun 26, 1981

A municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as neither the retributive nor deterrence objectives of punitive damages would be significantly advanced by holding municipalities liable for such damages.

Owen v. City of Independence

445 U.S. 622 (1980) · Apr 16, 1980

Municipalities have no qualified immunity in § 1983 actions — a local government may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability.

Monell v. Department of Social Services

436 U.S. 658 (1978) · Jun 6, 1978

Local governments are 'persons' that can be sued under § 1983 when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation — but a city cannot be held liable solely because it employs a wrongdoer.