Complaints That Survived a Motion to Dismiss

Degenhardt v. Bintliff

No. 24-40034 (5th Cir. 2024) · Sep 24, 2024

Brothers stated a Fourth Amendment claim that a traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion, but officers were entitled to qualified immunity on claims regarding vehicle impoundment and First Amendment retaliation for laughing and smirking during the encounter.

Bevill v. Fletcher

26 F.4th 270 (5th Cir. 2022) · Feb 11, 2022

A police captain's First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 survived a motion to dismiss where the complaint plausibly alleged that a judge, district attorney, and sheriff conspired to have him fired in retaliation for signing an affidavit critical of their professional relationships.

Kelson v. Clark

No. 20-10764 (5th Cir. 2021) · Jun 17, 2021

Paramedics who refused to treat a visibly injured, homeless, mentally ill man — instead harassing and laughing at him — were not entitled to qualified immunity on a failure-to-provide-medical-care claim after the man died from untreated head trauma in custody.

Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale

904 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2018) · Sep 12, 2018

Where officers committed an undisputed act of excessive force during an arrest, the Third Circuit clarified the standards for qualified immunity in excessive force cases, holding that when force is clearly excessive under the Graham factors, officers are not entitled to qualified immunity even without a prior case involving identical facts, and establishing the framework for analyzing excessive force claims at each stage of litigation.

Miranda v. County of Lake

900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) · Aug 10, 2018

The court clarified the standard for municipal liability under Monell, holding that a county could be liable under § 1983 for maintaining a widespread practice of excessive force where the practice was so pervasive that it constituted a de facto policy, and that private medical providers contracted by the county could not be shielded from § 1983 liability simply because they were not government employees.

Littell v. Houston Independent School District

894 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2018) · Jun 27, 2018

A school district's complete failure to provide Fourth Amendment training to employees who conduct student searches plausibly states a failure-to-train claim under § 1983, even without a pattern of prior violations.

Rose v. Herrera

No. EP-17-CV-00289 (W.D. Tex.) · Mar 15, 2018

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage where the plaintiff alleged officers used excessive force during an arrest, and the factual allegations, taken as true, stated a plausible Fourth Amendment violation.

Culbertson v. Lykos

790 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2015) · Jun 22, 2015

Former crime lab employees stated a plausible § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Harris County based on the Commissioners Court's ratification of the district attorney's alleged retaliatory campaign, but the assistant district attorney was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that a non-final-decision-maker could be individually liable for a recommendation leading to adverse action.

Jabary v. City of Allen

No. 12-41054 (5th Cir. 2013) · Nov 25, 2013

A business owner stated a procedural due process claim where city officials revoked his Certificate of Occupancy without adequate pre-deprivation process, but failed to state substantive due process, equal protection, or conspiracy claims.

Kopec v. Tate

361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004) · Mar 17, 2004

An officer who used excessive force during a traffic stop—including slamming a motorist's head into a car and choking him—was not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from gratuitous force against a non-resisting person during a seizure was clearly established, and the municipality could be liable under Monell where the officer's pattern of complaints was known to supervisors.

Carter v. Morris

164 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 1999) · Jan 14, 1999

Officers who burst into a home without warning, pointed guns at occupants' heads, and used excessive physical force during the execution of a search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, and were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from excessive force during the execution of a warrant was clearly established.

Roberts v. City of Forest Acres

902 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.C. 1995) · Aug 21, 1995

The court denied summary judgment for the city and officer on excessive force and municipal liability claims where evidence showed an officer used force significantly disproportionate to the threat posed during a traffic stop, and the city had inadequate training and supervision of its officers regarding use of force.

Shaw v. Stroud

13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994) · Jan 6, 1994

A police supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 for a subordinate's use of excessive force where the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of a pervasive pattern of misconduct, was deliberately indifferent to the risk, and there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the constitutional injury.

Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n

987 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993) · Apr 5, 1993

A district court may not dismiss a complaint at a pretrial conference without providing the procedural protections required by Rule 56 if the dismissal effectively constitutes summary judgment; leave to amend should be freely given when justice requires under Foman v. Davis.

Northington v. Jackson

973 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1992) · Aug 17, 1992

The Tenth Circuit established important procedural standards for § 1983 excessive force claims, holding that pro se complaints must be liberally construed and that dismissal without allowing amendment is improper when the plaintiff has alleged facts supporting constitutional violations by law enforcement.

Jackson v. Procunier

789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986) · May 9, 1986

A prisoner stated a First Amendment and due process claim where prison officials deliberately interfered with his legal mail, causing him to miss a court deadline, thus depriving him of his right to access the courts.