Landmark Section 1983 Decisions

Gonzalez v. Trevino

602 U.S. ___ (2024) · Jun 20, 2024

A plaintiff can use any objective evidence — not just strict comparator evidence — to show she was arrested when similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same protected speech had not been, thereby satisfying the narrow Nieves exception.

Vega v. Tekoh

597 U.S. 134 (2022) · Jun 23, 2022

A violation of Miranda's warning rules does not itself provide a basis for a Section 1983 damages claim.

Thompson v. Clark

596 U.S. 36 (2022) · Apr 4, 2022

To bring a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction; the plaintiff does not have to show that the termination affirmatively indicated innocence.

Taylor v. Riojas

592 U.S. 7 (2020) · Nov 2, 2020

No reasonable correctional officer could have concluded it was constitutionally permissible to confine an inmate in cells covered in human waste for six days — qualified immunity denied even without a prior case with identical facts.

Cole v. Carson

935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019) · Aug 20, 2019

Officers who shoot a suicidal teenager without warning — when the teen poses no threat and is unaware of the officers' presence — violate clearly established law, and disputed facts about the shooting must go to a jury.

McDonough v. Smith

588 U.S. 109 (2019) · Jun 20, 2019

A Section 1983 claim that fabricated evidence was used against the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding, in violation of due process, does not accrue until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff's favor.

Nieves v. Bartlett

587 U.S. 391 (2019) · May 28, 2019

The existence of probable cause generally defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under § 1983, with a narrow exception for cases where the plaintiff shows that similarly situated individuals not engaged in protected speech were not arrested.

Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale

904 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2018) · Sep 12, 2018

Where officers committed an undisputed act of excessive force during an arrest, the Third Circuit clarified the standards for qualified immunity in excessive force cases, holding that when force is clearly excessive under the Graham factors, officers are not entitled to qualified immunity even without a prior case involving identical facts, and establishing the framework for analyzing excessive force claims at each stage of litigation.

Miranda v. County of Lake

900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) · Aug 10, 2018

The court clarified the standard for municipal liability under Monell, holding that a county could be liable under § 1983 for maintaining a widespread practice of excessive force where the practice was so pervasive that it constituted a de facto policy, and that private medical providers contracted by the county could not be shielded from § 1983 liability simply because they were not government employees.

White v. Jackson

865 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2017) · Aug 1, 2017

The Eighth Circuit addressed § 1983 claims arising from the Ferguson, Missouri protests, holding that officers who used excessive force against protesters — including tear gas and rubber bullets against non-violent demonstrators — could be held liable, while also analyzing qualified immunity and municipal liability under Monell.

Ziglar v. Abbasi

582 U.S. 120 (2017) · Jun 19, 2017

The Court severely limited the Bivens implied damages remedy, holding that courts should not extend it to new contexts — and that post-9/11 detention policy claims present such a new context.

Turner v. Driver

848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017) · Feb 16, 2017

The First Amendment protects the right to record the police, subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions — and this right is clearly established going forward in the Fifth Circuit.

Mullenix v. Luna

577 U.S. 7 (2015) · Nov 9, 2015

Qualified immunity protects officers in the 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,' and courts must not define clearly established law at a high level of generality — especially in Fourth Amendment excessive-force cases.

Johnson v. City of Shelby

574 U.S. 10 (2014) · Nov 10, 2014

A § 1983 complaint need not invoke § 1983 by name — federal pleading rules require only a short and plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to relief, not citation to specific statutes.

Tolan v. Cotton

572 U.S. 650 (2014) · May 5, 2014

Courts ruling on summary judgment must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party — the Fifth Circuit erred by crediting the officer's version of disputed facts when denying an excessive force claim.

Morgan v. Swanson

659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011) · Oct 27, 2011

Public school officials who prevent students from distributing religious materials during non-instructional time violate clearly established First Amendment rights — schools may not suppress private religious expression solely because of its religious viewpoint.

Mattos v. Agarano

661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) · Oct 12, 2011

The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that officers' use of a Taser in dart mode against a non-threatening, non-fleeing individual constitutes excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The court consolidated two cases — one from Hawaii and Brooks v. City of Seattle — establishing that Tasers are a serious use of force requiring significant justification.

Connick v. Thompson

563 U.S. 51 (2011) · Mar 29, 2011

A district attorney's office may not be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train prosecutors based on a single Brady violation — absent a pattern of similar violations, a single incident is generally insufficient to prove deliberate indifference.

Raiche v. Pietroski

623 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2010) · Oct 25, 2010

The First Circuit held that a police officer who conducted an invasive strip search at a police station without reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was concealing weapons or contraband violated the Fourth Amendment, and that this right was clearly established — defeating qualified immunity.

Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.

560 U.S. 538 (2010) · Jun 7, 2010

Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), whether an amended complaint naming a new defendant relates back depends on what the new defendant knew or should have known during the Rule 4(m) period, not on what the plaintiff knew or how long the plaintiff waited to amend.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal

556 U.S. 662 (2009) · May 18, 2009

A complaint must plead facts that make a claim plausible, not merely possible — conclusory allegations and legal labels are not enough.

Pearson v. Callahan

555 U.S. 223 (2009) · Jan 21, 2009

Courts deciding qualified immunity claims have discretion to skip the constitutional-violation question and resolve the case solely on the 'clearly established' prong.

Erickson v. Pardus

551 U.S. 89 (2007) · Jun 4, 2007

Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, not specific facts, and a pro se complaint must be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than a pleading drafted by a lawyer.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

550 U.S. 544 (2007) · May 21, 2007

A complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face — bare assertions and conclusory allegations are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park

486 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2007) · May 18, 2007

The Eighth Circuit held that an officer's decision to release a police dog to bite and hold a suspect who was not actively resisting or fleeing constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, and that qualified immunity did not protect the officer because the unlawfulness of the conduct was clearly established.

Scott v. Harris

550 U.S. 372 (2007) · Apr 30, 2007

When video evidence blatantly contradicts the plaintiff's version of events, courts need not adopt the plaintiff's account at summary judgment — and a police officer who rams a fleeing motorist's car to end a dangerous high-speed chase does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Wallace v. Kato

549 U.S. 384 (2007) · Feb 21, 2007

A Section 1983 false-arrest or false-imprisonment claim accrues when the plaintiff is detained pursuant to legal process, such as arraignment, not when the criminal charges are later dismissed, and Heck v. Humphrey does not delay accrual based on a conviction that has not yet occurred.

Hartman v. Moore

547 U.S. 250 (2006) · Apr 26, 2006

A plaintiff alleging retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment must plead and prove that the underlying criminal charge was not supported by probable cause.

Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

543 U.S. 335 (2005) · Jan 12, 2005

When Congress includes an express requirement in some parts of a statute but not in another, courts should not lightly assume the missing requirement was silently meant to apply anyway.

Brosseau v. Haugen

543 U.S. 194 (2004) · Dec 13, 2004

A police officer who shot a fleeing suspect in the back as he attempted to drive away was entitled to qualified immunity because the relevant case law placed her conduct in the 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,' and existing precedent did not clearly establish that her actions violated the Fourth Amendment.

Devenpeck v. Alford

543 U.S. 146 (2004) · Dec 13, 2004

A warrantless arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to believe that any crime has been or is being committed, regardless of whether that offense is 'closely related' to the offense the officer states at the time of arrest.

Lawrence v. Kenosha County

391 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2004) · Dec 2, 2004

The Seventh Circuit held that an officer's use of a chokehold and other physical force against a compliant arrestee was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that qualified immunity did not protect the officer because the right to be free from gratuitous force was clearly established.

Kopec v. Tate

361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004) · Mar 17, 2004

An officer who used excessive force during a traffic stop—including slamming a motorist's head into a car and choking him—was not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from gratuitous force against a non-resisting person during a seizure was clearly established, and the municipality could be liable under Monell where the officer's pattern of complaints was known to supervisors.

Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford

361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004) · Mar 15, 2004

The Second Circuit addressed the statute of limitations for § 1983 excessive force claims brought as a class action, holding that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred where they failed to file within the applicable limitations period. The court also examined Monell municipal liability and the standards for bringing class-wide excessive force claims against a police department.

Hughes v. Lott

350 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2003) · Nov 14, 2003

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a pro se prisoner's § 1983 claims against City of Mobile police officers, holding that Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful search and seizure are generally not barred by Heck v. Humphrey because a successful suit would not necessarily invalidate the plaintiff's conviction. The court also held that prisoners may seek nominal damages for constitutional violations even without physical injury under the PLRA.

Hope v. Pelzer

536 U.S. 730 (2002) · Jun 27, 2002

A constitutional right can be 'clearly established' for qualified immunity purposes even without a prior case involving identical facts — the obvious cruelty of the conduct itself can provide fair warning.

Deorle v. Rutherford

272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) · Nov 19, 2001

A deputy sheriff who shot an unarmed, emotionally disturbed man in the face with a lead-filled beanbag round—without warning and while negotiators were en route—used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and was not entitled to qualified immunity, because no reasonable officer could have believed such force was lawful against a person who had committed no serious offense, posed no immediate threat, and had generally complied with police commands.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

532 U.S. 318 (2001) · Apr 24, 2001

The Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless custodial arrest for a minor criminal offense — even a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine — as long as the officer has probable cause.

Piotrowski v. City of Houston

237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001) · Jan 8, 2001

To establish Monell liability in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff must show: (1) an official policy or widespread practice constituting a 'custom'; (2) a policymaker who can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge of the custom; and (3) a constitutional violation whose 'moving force' was the policy or custom.

Priester v. City of Riviera Beach

208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2000) · Apr 4, 2000

Police officers who ordered a K-9 to attack a compliant, non-threatening suspect who had surrendered with his hands up—and then stood by watching the dog maul him for two minutes—used excessive force and were not entitled to qualified immunity, even absent directly on-point case law, because the conduct was so obviously unconstitutional that no reasonable officer could believe it was permissible.

Carter v. Morris

164 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 1999) · Jan 14, 1999

Officers who burst into a home without warning, pointed guns at occupants' heads, and used excessive physical force during the execution of a search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, and were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from excessive force during the execution of a warrant was clearly established.

County of Sacramento v. Lewis

523 U.S. 833 (1998) · May 26, 1998

A police officer does not violate substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender; only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives violates the Fourteenth Amendment in such circumstances.

Barney v. Pulsipher

143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998) · May 1, 1998

The Tenth Circuit established the framework for supervisory liability under § 1983, holding that a supervisor can be held personally liable when there is an affirmative link between the supervisor's conduct and the constitutional violation. The court articulated that liability requires the supervisor to have had actual or constructive knowledge of a risk of constitutional harm and to have failed to act to prevent it.

Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown

520 U.S. 397 (1997) · Apr 28, 1997

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a single hiring decision unless the plaintiff demonstrates that adequate screening of the applicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of hiring that applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's constitutional rights.

Whren v. United States

517 U.S. 806 (1996) · Jun 10, 1996

The temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe he has violated traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.

Pyles v. Raisor

60 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1995) · Aug 1, 1995

The Sixth Circuit held that officers who used excessive force during an arrest were not entitled to qualified immunity, finding that the right to be free from gratuitous violence during an arrest was clearly established. The court also held that the plaintiff's failure to file a formal complaint did not preclude her § 1983 claim.

Kyles v. Whitley

514 U.S. 419 (1995) · Apr 19, 1995

Suppressed favorable evidence is material under Brady when, considered cumulatively, it undermines confidence in the verdict; the defendant need not show acquittal was more likely than not, and the prosecutor has a duty to learn of favorable evidence known to police acting on the government's behalf.

Grossman v. City of Portland

33 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1994) · Sep 6, 1994

The Ninth Circuit held that a police officer who used excessive force during an encounter with a citizen was not entitled to qualified immunity, and that the City of Portland could be held liable under Monell if its policies or customs contributed to the constitutional violation. The court clarified the standards for municipal liability and individual officer liability in excessive force cases.

Adams v. Metiva

31 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 1994) · Aug 1, 1994

An officer who used excessive force during an arrest—including beating a suspect who was not resisting—was not entitled to qualified immunity, and the court established that the right to be free from excessive force during an arrest was clearly established in the Sixth Circuit, requiring a fact-intensive inquiry into the totality of the circumstances under Graham v. Connor.

Heck v. Humphrey

512 U.S. 477 (1994) · Jun 24, 1994

A § 1983 claim for damages is barred if success on that claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing criminal conviction — the conviction must first be reversed or invalidated.

Shaw v. Stroud

13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994) · Jan 6, 1994

A police supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 for a subordinate's use of excessive force where the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of a pervasive pattern of misconduct, was deliberately indifferent to the risk, and there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the constitutional injury.

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit

507 U.S. 163 (1993) · Mar 3, 1993

Federal courts may not apply a heightened pleading standard to § 1983 claims alleging municipal liability — the ordinary notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule 8(a)(2) apply.

Farrar v. Hobby

506 U.S. 103 (1992) · Dec 14, 1992

A plaintiff who wins only nominal damages is a prevailing party under Section 1988, but the reasonable attorney-fee award in that situation may be little or nothing.

Northington v. Jackson

973 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1992) · Aug 17, 1992

The Tenth Circuit established important procedural standards for § 1983 excessive force claims, holding that pro se complaints must be liberally construed and that dismissal without allowing amendment is improper when the plaintiff has alleged facts supporting constitutional violations by law enforcement.

Wyatt v. Cole

504 U.S. 158 (1992) · Mar 23, 1992

Private parties who use a state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statute later found unconstitutional do not get qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Pennsylvania v. Muniz

496 U.S. 582 (1990) · Jun 18, 1990

Routine booking questions do not constitute interrogation under Miranda, but a question designed to elicit a testimonial response revealing the suspect's mental state (such as asking the date of his sixth birthday) requires Miranda warnings.

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police

491 U.S. 58 (1989) · Jun 15, 1989

Neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacity are 'persons' under § 1983 — meaning § 1983 cannot be used to sue states or state officials in their official capacity for money damages.

Graham v. Connor

490 U.S. 386 (1989) · May 15, 1989

All claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard — not substantive due process.

City of Canton v. Harris

489 U.S. 378 (1989) · Feb 28, 1989

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 for failing to train its employees when the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons the employees encounter.

Meade v. Grubbs

841 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988) · Mar 11, 1988

The Tenth Circuit established important standards for evaluating pro se prisoner civil rights complaints, holding that courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings and that a pro se plaintiff alleging physical violence and denial of medical care by sheriff's deputies states cognizable claims under § 1983. The court also addressed qualified immunity standards for law enforcement officers accused of excessive force.

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik

485 U.S. 112 (1988) · Mar 2, 1988

Identifying which officials have 'final policymaking authority' for Monell purposes is a question of state and local law to be decided by the court — not a question of fact for the jury — and merely going along with a subordinate's decisions does not constitute delegation of policymaking authority.

Anderson v. Creighton

483 U.S. 635 (1987) · Jun 25, 1987

Qualified immunity turns on whether a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the specific facts the officer faced.

City of Riverside v. Rivera

477 U.S. 561 (1986) · Jun 27, 1986

Attorney's fees under Section 1988 do not have to be proportional to the damages recovered in a civil-rights case.

Malley v. Briggs

475 U.S. 335 (1986) · Mar 5, 1986

An officer who obtains an arrest warrant by submitting an affidavit so lacking in probable cause that no reasonably competent officer would have relied on it is not shielded by qualified immunity — the shield protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.

Thomas v. Arn

474 U.S. 140 (1985) · Dec 4, 1985

A court of appeals may adopt a rule that a party who fails to file timely objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation forfeits appellate review of the unobjected findings, so long as the party was warned of that consequence.

Kentucky v. Graham

473 U.S. 159 (1985) · Jun 28, 1985

Personal-capacity suits seek to hold an officer personally liable; official-capacity suits are really suits against the government entity itself — and fee liability under § 1988 runs with merits liability, not against non-parties.

Tennessee v. Garner

471 U.S. 1 (1985) · Mar 27, 1985

Police may not use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect unless the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.

Tower v. Glover

467 U.S. 914 (1984) · Jun 27, 1984

Public defenders do not have immunity from § 1983 suits alleging they intentionally conspired with state officials to deprive a client of federal rights.

New York v. Quarles

467 U.S. 649 (1984) · Jun 12, 1984

Police may ask limited questions without Miranda warnings when they face an immediate public-safety emergency, such as finding a missing weapon.

Illinois v. Gates

462 U.S. 213 (1983) · Jun 8, 1983

The rigid 'two-pronged test' for evaluating informant tips under Aguilar-Spinelli is replaced by a 'totality of the circumstances' approach for determining probable cause.

McKinley v. City of Eloy

705 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1983) · May 9, 1983

The Ninth Circuit held that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 for inadequate police training and supervision that amounts to deliberate indifference, and that officers' use of deadly force was constitutionally excessive where the suspect did not pose an immediate threat.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald

457 U.S. 800 (1982) · Jun 24, 1982

Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from damages liability unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.

453 U.S. 247 (1981) · Jun 26, 1981

A municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as neither the retributive nor deterrence objectives of punitive damages would be significantly advanced by holding municipalities liable for such damages.

Owen v. City of Independence

445 U.S. 622 (1980) · Apr 16, 1980

Municipalities have no qualified immunity in § 1983 actions — a local government may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability.

Baker v. McCollan

443 U.S. 137 (1979) · Jun 26, 1979

Detention pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause merely because the wrong person was arrested, and a sheriff executing a valid warrant is not constitutionally required to independently investigate every claim of innocence.

Franks v. Delaware

438 U.S. 154 (1978) · Jun 26, 1978

When a defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a police officer knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth included a false statement in a warrant affidavit, and the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause, the warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded.

Monell v. Department of Social Services

436 U.S. 658 (1978) · Jun 6, 1978

Local governments are 'persons' that can be sued under § 1983 when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation — but a city cannot be held liable solely because it employs a wrongdoer.

Stone v. Powell

428 U.S. 465 (1976) · Jul 6, 1976

Where a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial.

Imbler v. Pachtman

424 U.S. 409 (1976) · Mar 2, 1976

A state prosecutor has absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages claims for acts tied to initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and presenting the State's case.

Giglio v. United States

405 U.S. 150 (1972) · Feb 24, 1972

The prosecution violates due process when it fails to disclose a material promise of leniency made to a key witness; impeachment evidence falls within Brady, and the government's disclosure duty is not avoided because one prosecutor did not know what another prosecutor promised.

Sibron v. New York

392 U.S. 40 (1968) · Jun 10, 1968

An officer who observed a suspect talking with known narcotics addicts over an eight-hour period did not have probable cause to search the suspect, and a frisk that reached into the suspect's pocket without an articulable basis to believe the suspect was armed exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop.

Terry v. Ohio

392 U.S. 1 (1968) · Jun 10, 1968

A police officer may briefly stop and pat down a person for weapons if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity and may be armed and dangerous.

Pierson v. Ray

386 U.S. 547 (1967) · Apr 11, 1967

Police officers sued under § 1983 may raise the defense of good faith and probable cause — the origin of what would later become qualified immunity.

Beck v. Ohio

379 U.S. 89 (1964) · Nov 23, 1964

An arrest without a warrant must be based on probable cause, and where officers lacked sufficient facts to justify an arrest—relying only on the suspect's prior record and an unverified tip—the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and evidence obtained in a search incident to that arrest must be suppressed.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

376 U.S. 254 (1964) · Mar 9, 1964

A public official cannot recover damages for defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct unless the statement was made with 'actual malice' — knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

Brady v. Maryland

373 U.S. 83 (1963) · May 13, 1963

The prosecution violates due process when it suppresses evidence favorable to the accused that is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the prosecutor's good faith or bad faith.

Foman v. Davis

371 U.S. 178 (1962) · Dec 3, 1962

Leave to amend a pleading under Rule 15(a) should be freely given when justice so requires, and should not be denied absent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of the amendment.

Monroe v. Pape

365 U.S. 167 (1961) · Feb 20, 1961

Section 1983 reaches police officers who misuse state authority even when their actions violate state law, and plaintiffs do not have to exhaust state remedies before suing in federal court.

Brown v. Board of Education

347 U.S. 483 (1954) · May 17, 1954

Racial segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause and the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place in public education.

Plessy v. Ferguson

163 U.S. 537 (1896) · May 18, 1896

The Court upheld state-enforced racial segregation under the 'separate but equal' doctrine, a rule later rejected by Brown.