Excessive Force Cases

Ryan v. Lopez

No. 24-40299 (5th Cir. 2025) · Jun 9, 2025

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity where they used force during a traffic stop after the plaintiff physically resisted arrest, even though the initial stop may have been pretextual.

Barnes v. Felix

605 U.S. ___ (2025) · May 15, 2025

The Fifth Circuit's 'moment-of-threat' rule, which limited the excessive force inquiry to only the instant of the shooting, conflicts with the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis required by the Fourth Amendment; courts must consider the full sequence of events leading to the use of force.

Escalante v. Hammel

No. 24-50505 (5th Cir. 2025) · Jan 15, 2025

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims where the plaintiff alleged officers repeatedly tased him while he was restrained and not resisting.

Bailey v. Ramos

No. 23-50185 (5th Cir. 2025) · Jan 10, 2025

Officer was entitled to qualified immunity on unlawful arrest, seizure, First Amendment retaliation, and excessive force claims where plaintiff went to downtown San Antonio specifically to confront police and the officer had arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Young v. City of Irving

No. 3:23-CV-1423-D (N.D. Tex. 2024) · Sep 12, 2024

Granted motions to dismiss pro se plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the City of Irving and police officers but granted leave to replead; held that video evidence contradicting the plaintiff's allegations of unlawful arrest and excessive force entitled officers to qualified immunity, and that municipal liability claims based on conclusory allegations of policy or custom failed.

Terrell v. Town of Woodworth

No. 23-30510 (5th Cir. 2024) · Feb 19, 2024

Addressed qualified immunity and the use of force during a traffic stop, examining whether the officers' conduct was objectively reasonable under the Graham v. Connor framework and whether the right at issue was clearly established.

Barrera v. City of Irving

No. 3:24-CV-0177 (N.D. Tex.) · Jan 25, 2024

Pending civil rights action alleging excessive force and municipal liability against the City of Irving and its officers.

Traylor v. Yorka

No. 22-10783 (5th Cir. 2024) · Jan 19, 2024

Affirmed qualified immunity for an off-duty officer on excessive force and unlawful arrest claims arising from a bar altercation, but reversed denial of qualified immunity on a fabrication-of-evidence claim where the officer's account was disputed by video evidence.

Livingston v. Texas

No. 22-11210 (5th Cir. 2024) · Jan 16, 2024

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity in a fatal shooting where body camera footage 'blatantly contradicted' the plaintiff's allegations that the decedent was complying with commands, showing instead that he exited his car with a gun pointed at the officers.

Sligh v. City of Conroe

No. 22-40518 (5th Cir. 2023) · Nov 21, 2023

While siccing a police dog on a suicidal woman who was not suspected of any crime and posed no threat to officers constituted excessive force, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established under the specific circumstances, which involved active resistance followed by unintentionally prolonged canine force.

Zavala v. Harris County

No. 22-20611 (5th Cir. 2023) · Nov 21, 2023

Affirmed dismissal of Monell claims against Harris County and grant of qualified immunity to a jailer on excessive force claims arising from use of hog-tie restraints on a pretrial detainee, holding that the use of hog-ties was not clearly established as unconstitutional where the detainee exhibited disorderly and self-injurious behavior.

Spiller v. Harris County

No. 22-20123 (5th Cir. 2023) · Jan 1, 2023

Reaffirmed that employees of the same legal entity cannot conspire among themselves under § 1983 and that municipal liability requires identification of an official policy or custom, not merely individual officer misconduct.

Buehler v. Dear

No. 20-50822 (5th Cir. 2022) · Mar 3, 2022

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on a police-accountability activist's false arrest and excessive force claims arising from his arrest while filming police on a crowded street, but genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on certain excessive force claims.

Spiller v. Harris County, Texas

No. 21-20574 (5th Cir. 2022) · Jan 1, 2022

Employees of the same municipal entity cannot conspire among themselves for purposes of a § 1983 conspiracy claim because a single legal entity cannot conspire with itself.

Stephenson v. McClelland

No. 3:20-CV-3599-S (N.D. Tex.) · Jan 1, 2022

Addressed qualified immunity and pleading standards in a § 1983 excessive force and false arrest case, emphasizing the plaintiff's burden to allege facts sufficient to overcome the qualified immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage.

Harmon v. City of Arlington

16 F.4th 1159 (5th Cir. 2021) · Oct 26, 2021

An officer who fatally shot a driver while clinging to the side of the driver's fleeing SUV was entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably perceived a threat of serious physical harm, and plaintiffs failed to identify clearly established law prohibiting deadly force under those specific circumstances.

Ordonez v. Gonzalez

No. 20-40624 (5th Cir. 2021) · Aug 25, 2021

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they used deadly force against a suspect who was moving away from them and did not pose an immediate threat at the moment of the shooting.

Kelson v. Clark

No. 20-10764 (5th Cir. 2021) · Jun 17, 2021

Paramedics who refused to treat a visibly injured, homeless, mentally ill man — instead harassing and laughing at him — were not entitled to qualified immunity on a failure-to-provide-medical-care claim after the man died from untreated head trauma in custody.

Esquivel v. Eastburn

No. SA-20-CV-00377-OLG (W.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2021) · Apr 28, 2021

A pro se plaintiff's § 1983 claims against state troopers for unlawful arrest, illegal search, and excessive force survived initial screening but were subject to dismissal where the plaintiff failed to state plausible claims against certain defendants.

Batyukova v. Doege

994 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2021) · Apr 21, 2021

An off-duty sheriff's deputy was entitled to qualified immunity for using deadly force against a woman who ignored commands and appeared to reach for a weapon during a late-night highway encounter, and for allegedly failing to provide timely medical assistance.

Hutcheson v. Dallas County

No. 20-10383 (5th Cir. 2021) · Apr 12, 2021

Officers who restrained a man under the influence of drugs were entitled to qualified immunity where their conduct did not violate clearly established law, and a single incident was insufficient to establish failure-to-train liability.

Roque v. Harvel

993 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2021) · Apr 1, 2021

An officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where he shot and killed a suicidal man during a mental health crisis, because a jury could find the officer's continued firing after the initial shot was objectively unreasonable.

Ratliff v. Aransas County

948 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2020) · Jan 15, 2020

Deputies were entitled to qualified immunity where they shot a man five times after he refused to drop a loaded pistol during a domestic violence call, despite his later acquittal on criminal charges.

Cole v. Carson

935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019) · Aug 20, 2019

Officers who shoot a suicidal teenager without warning — when the teen poses no threat and is unaware of the officers' presence — violate clearly established law, and disputed facts about the shooting must go to a jury.

Nieves v. Bartlett

587 U.S. 391 (2019) · May 28, 2019

The existence of probable cause generally defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under § 1983, with a narrow exception for cases where the plaintiff shows that similarly situated individuals not engaged in protected speech were not arrested.

Rich v. Palko

920 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2019) · Apr 3, 2019

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity when they used force to transport an incapacitated person with severe mental disabilities to a psychiatric facility, where the person's caretaker had called 911 requesting police assistance with the transport.

Westfall v. Luna

903 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2018) · Sep 13, 2018

Reversed summary judgment on false arrest claims where fact issues existed on probable cause; affirmed qualified immunity on excessive force (de minimis injury from assisting officer), First Amendment retaliation (force motivated by conduct not speech), denial of medical treatment (45-minute delay not deliberately indifferent), and failure to train claims against the City.

Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale

904 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2018) · Sep 12, 2018

Where officers committed an undisputed act of excessive force during an arrest, the Third Circuit clarified the standards for qualified immunity in excessive force cases, holding that when force is clearly excessive under the Graham factors, officers are not entitled to qualified immunity even without a prior case involving identical facts, and establishing the framework for analyzing excessive force claims at each stage of litigation.

Miranda v. County of Lake

900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) · Aug 10, 2018

The court clarified the standard for municipal liability under Monell, holding that a county could be liable under § 1983 for maintaining a widespread practice of excessive force where the practice was so pervasive that it constituted a de facto policy, and that private medical providers contracted by the county could not be shielded from § 1983 liability simply because they were not government employees.

Rose v. Herrera

No. EP-17-CV-00289 (W.D. Tex.) · Mar 15, 2018

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage where the plaintiff alleged officers used excessive force during an arrest, and the factual allegations, taken as true, stated a plausible Fourth Amendment violation.

Peña v. City of Rio Grande City

879 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2018) · Jan 12, 2018

The district court erred in disregarding a plaintiff's proposed amended complaint; when the amended complaint stated plausible excessive force claims against officers who tased a woman during a family dispute, the case should proceed to qualified immunity analysis.

White v. Jackson

865 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2017) · Aug 1, 2017

The Eighth Circuit addressed § 1983 claims arising from the Ferguson, Missouri protests, holding that officers who used excessive force against protesters — including tear gas and rubber bullets against non-violent demonstrators — could be held liable, while also analyzing qualified immunity and municipal liability under Monell.

Ziglar v. Abbasi

582 U.S. 120 (2017) · Jun 19, 2017

The Court severely limited the Bivens implied damages remedy, holding that courts should not extend it to new contexts — and that post-9/11 detention policy claims present such a new context.

Alexander v. City of Round Rock

854 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2017) · Apr 18, 2017

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims where plaintiff alleged he was forcibly removed from his vehicle, pinned face-down, and had a knee pressed on his neck during a traffic stop despite offering no physical resistance.

Hanks v. Rogers

853 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2017) · Apr 5, 2017

An officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where he used a physical 'half spear' takedown against a passively resisting motorist who posed no immediate threat, had his empty hands displayed behind his back, and was stopped for only a minor traffic violation.

Brooks v. City of West Point, Mississippi

639 F. App'x 986 (5th Cir. 2016) · Feb 11, 2016

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim where, viewing the facts in the plaintiff's favor, the plaintiff was grabbed, slammed against a garage door, and forced to the ground while not physically resisting, but were entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim where arguable probable cause existed for disorderly conduct.

Mullenix v. Luna

577 U.S. 7 (2015) · Nov 9, 2015

Qualified immunity protects officers in the 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,' and courts must not define clearly established law at a high level of generality — especially in Fourth Amendment excessive-force cases.

Carroll v. Ellington

800 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2015) · Aug 26, 2015

Deputies were entitled to qualified immunity on unlawful search and seizure claims and most excessive force claims arising from a fatal confrontation with a paranoid schizophrenic in his home, but not on excessive force claims for force used after the suspect was subdued and ceased resisting.

Curran v. Aleshire

800 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 2015) · Aug 25, 2015

A school resource officer's interlocutory appeal of a denied qualified immunity claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where the officer challenged the genuineness rather than the materiality of factual disputes regarding his use of force against a high school student.

Chacon v. Copeland

577 F. App'x 355 (5th Cir. 2014) · Aug 11, 2014

The district court properly denied qualified immunity to officers on excessive force claims where the plaintiff alleged he was beaten while compliant and not resisting arrest.

Tolan v. Cotton

572 U.S. 650 (2014) · May 5, 2014

Courts ruling on summary judgment must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party — the Fifth Circuit erred by crediting the officer's version of disputed facts when denying an excessive force claim.

Ramirez v. Martinez

716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013) · May 15, 2013

A deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims where he tased a business owner twice — including once while the owner was handcuffed and lying face-down — during an encounter at the owner's own business; but the deputy had arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Poole v. City of Shreveport

691 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2012) · Aug 16, 2012

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims arising from an arrest following a traffic stop, where a videotape showed the plaintiff's account of events was contradicted by the objective record.

Collins v. Bauer

No. 3:11-CV-00887-B (N.D. Tex. 2012) · Jan 23, 2012

A motorcyclist's § 1983 excessive force and conspiracy claims against Dallas police officers survived motions to dismiss where the complaint alleged officers chased the plaintiff in violation of department policy, rammed his motorcycle, and beat him while he lay spread-eagled on the ground.

Morgan v. Swanson

659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011) · Oct 27, 2011

Public school officials who prevent students from distributing religious materials during non-instructional time violate clearly established First Amendment rights — schools may not suppress private religious expression solely because of its religious viewpoint.

Barrios-Barrios v. Clipps

825 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. La. 2011) · Oct 20, 2011

Section 1983 excessive force and unlawful detention claims arising from a police encounter in New Orleans; the court analyzed the claims under the Graham v. Connor objective reasonableness standard and addressed qualified immunity for the individual officers.

Mattos v. Agarano

661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) · Oct 12, 2011

The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that officers' use of a Taser in dart mode against a non-threatening, non-fleeing individual constitutes excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The court consolidated two cases — one from Hawaii and Brooks v. City of Seattle — establishing that Tasers are a serious use of force requiring significant justification.

Connick v. Thompson

563 U.S. 51 (2011) · Mar 29, 2011

A district attorney's office may not be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train prosecutors based on a single Brady violation — absent a pattern of similar violations, a single incident is generally insufficient to prove deliberate indifference.

Carnaby v. City of Houston

636 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2011) · Mar 22, 2011

Summary judgment was properly granted for the City of Houston and its officers in a § 1983 excessive force case arising from a fatal police shooting where the decedent fled from a traffic stop, led police on a high-speed chase, and was armed.

Lago-Planas v. Crocker

No. 3:09-CV-2075-G-BK (N.D. Tex.) · Mar 15, 2011

Officers were entitled to summary judgment on false arrest, excessive force, and denial of medical care claims where the evidence showed probable cause existed, force was reasonable, and the plaintiff's injuries did not require immediate medical treatment.

Peterson v. City of Fort Worth

588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009) · Nov 17, 2009

Even where officers may have used excessive force during an arrest, the plaintiff cannot recover against the municipality under Monell without proving that a city policy, practice, or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Baird v. Renbarger

576 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 2009) · Aug 3, 2009

The Seventh Circuit held that an officer who used excessive force during a traffic stop — including slamming a compliant suspect's head into a car — was not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from gratuitous force during a seizure was clearly established.

Goodman v. Harris County

571 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2009) · Jul 2, 2009

A jury instruction asking whether an officer's use of force was 'clearly excessive and objectively unreasonable' properly submitted the qualified immunity issue to the jury; the jury's finding of excessive force was affirmed.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal

556 U.S. 662 (2009) · May 18, 2009

A complaint must plead facts that make a claim plausible, not merely possible — conclusory allegations and legal labels are not enough.

Deville v. Marcantel

567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009) · May 1, 2009

The Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment for officers on false arrest and excessive force claims arising from a traffic stop where evidence showed the officer may have lacked probable cause for speeding and used disproportionate force to extract a passively resisting woman from her car, but affirmed dismissal of municipal liability claims.

Graham v. City of Irving

No. 3:07-CV-0834-D (N.D. Tex.) · Sep 30, 2008

In a § 1983 excessive force case, the plaintiff must show (1) an injury (2) resulting directly from clearly excessive force (3) the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable; the city cannot be liable under Monell absent a policy or custom that was the moving force behind the violation.

Mesa v. Prejean

543 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2008) · Sep 23, 2008

Where factual disputes exist about whether an officer had probable cause to arrest someone for criminal trespass or disturbing the peace, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is inappropriate; protected speech cannot be the true basis for an arrest.

Spencer v. Rau

542 F. Supp. 2d 583 (W.D. Tex. 2007) · Dec 1, 2007

Officers were entitled to qualified and official immunity where they arrested a Good Samaritan nurse who refused to leave an accident scene, shoved an officer, and broke free of the officer's grip, because probable cause existed for interfering with public duties and the force used to handcuff the plaintiff was not excessive.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

550 U.S. 544 (2007) · May 21, 2007

A complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face — bare assertions and conclusory allegations are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park

486 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2007) · May 18, 2007

The Eighth Circuit held that an officer's decision to release a police dog to bite and hold a suspect who was not actively resisting or fleeing constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, and that qualified immunity did not protect the officer because the unlawfulness of the conduct was clearly established.

Scott v. Harris

550 U.S. 372 (2007) · Apr 30, 2007

When video evidence blatantly contradicts the plaintiff's version of events, courts need not adopt the plaintiff's account at summary judgment — and a police officer who rams a fleeing motorist's car to end a dangerous high-speed chase does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Freeman v. Gore

483 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2007) · Apr 2, 2007

Deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity on an unlawful arrest claim where they arrested a bystander mother without probable cause at her own home while attempting to serve a felony warrant on her son, but were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim.

Padilla v. Mason

169 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App. 2005) · Jun 23, 2005

DPS troopers were entitled to qualified immunity and official immunity where an officer used an arm bar technique during a pat-down search and the plaintiff resisted, even though the plaintiff suffered a broken arm.

Tarver v. City of Edna

410 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 2005) · May 25, 2005

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on unlawful arrest and handcuffing claims during a custody dispute, but genuine issues of material fact precluded qualified immunity on excessive force claims where an officer allegedly slammed a police car door on a handcuffed detainee's foot and head.

Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of North Richland Hills

406 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2005) · Apr 11, 2005

Supervisory officials were entitled to qualified immunity where the record could not support a conclusion that supervisory liability would attach for a SWAT officer's shooting during execution of a no-knock warrant.

Brosseau v. Haugen

543 U.S. 194 (2004) · Dec 13, 2004

A police officer who shot a fleeing suspect in the back as he attempted to drive away was entitled to qualified immunity because the relevant case law placed her conduct in the 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,' and existing precedent did not clearly establish that her actions violated the Fourth Amendment.

Lawrence v. Kenosha County

391 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2004) · Dec 2, 2004

The Seventh Circuit held that an officer's use of a chokehold and other physical force against a compliant arrestee was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that qualified immunity did not protect the officer because the right to be free from gratuitous force was clearly established.

Kopec v. Tate

361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004) · Mar 17, 2004

An officer who used excessive force during a traffic stop—including slamming a motorist's head into a car and choking him—was not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from gratuitous force against a non-resisting person during a seizure was clearly established, and the municipality could be liable under Monell where the officer's pattern of complaints was known to supervisors.

Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford

361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004) · Mar 15, 2004

The Second Circuit addressed the statute of limitations for § 1983 excessive force claims brought as a class action, holding that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred where they failed to file within the applicable limitations period. The court also examined Monell municipal liability and the standards for bringing class-wide excessive force claims against a police department.

Hope v. Pelzer

536 U.S. 730 (2002) · Jun 27, 2002

A constitutional right can be 'clearly established' for qualified immunity purposes even without a prior case involving identical facts — the obvious cruelty of the conduct itself can provide fair warning.

Deorle v. Rutherford

272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) · Nov 19, 2001

A deputy sheriff who shot an unarmed, emotionally disturbed man in the face with a lead-filled beanbag round—without warning and while negotiators were en route—used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and was not entitled to qualified immunity, because no reasonable officer could have believed such force was lawful against a person who had committed no serious offense, posed no immediate threat, and had generally complied with police commands.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

532 U.S. 318 (2001) · Apr 24, 2001

The Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless custodial arrest for a minor criminal offense — even a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine — as long as the officer has probable cause.

Texas DPS v. Petta

44 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. 2001) · Mar 29, 2001

Collateral estoppel barred a plaintiff's civil assault claims against a trooper where a criminal jury had already found beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff did not reasonably believe she faced imminent harm from the trooper's actions; the Texas Department of Public Safety was entitled to sovereign immunity because the claims arose out of intentional torts excluded from the Tort Claims Act's waiver.

Glenn v. City of Tyler

242 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2001) · Feb 22, 2001

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on claims of unlawful arrest without probable cause for family violence assault and excessive force from overly tight handcuffing where genuine issues of material fact existed.

Brown v. Bryan County (On Remand)

219 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2000) · Jul 18, 2000

On remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the jury's verdict against the county could be sustained under the Supreme Court's heightened deliberate-indifference standard for single-hiring-decision municipal liability.

Gros v. City of Grand Prairie

209 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2000) · Apr 25, 2000

A police chief was entitled to qualified immunity on a deliberate-indifference-in-hiring claim where the hired officer's pre-employment file, though containing red flags, did not establish a strong causal connection between his background and the specific constitutional violations (sexual assault, excessive force) he later committed.

Priester v. City of Riviera Beach

208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2000) · Apr 4, 2000

Police officers who ordered a K-9 to attack a compliant, non-threatening suspect who had surrendered with his hands up—and then stood by watching the dog maul him for two minutes—used excessive force and were not entitled to qualified immunity, even absent directly on-point case law, because the conduct was so obviously unconstitutional that no reasonable officer could believe it was permissible.

Carter v. Morris

164 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 1999) · Jan 14, 1999

Officers who burst into a home without warning, pointed guns at occupants' heads, and used excessive physical force during the execution of a search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, and were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from excessive force during the execution of a warrant was clearly established.

Benningfield v. City of Houston

157 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1998) · Oct 6, 1998

A plaintiff pursuing a municipal liability claim based on failure to train must demonstrate a pattern of similar violations to establish deliberate indifference, and a single incident of excessive force is generally insufficient to prove a municipal custom or policy.

County of Sacramento v. Lewis

523 U.S. 833 (1998) · May 26, 1998

A police officer does not violate substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender; only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives violates the Fourteenth Amendment in such circumstances.

Snyder v. Trepagnier

142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998) · May 8, 1998

The city was not liable under Monell for the shooting of a fleeing suspect because the plaintiff failed to establish deliberate indifference or a causal link between the city's hiring, screening, or stress management policies and the constitutional violation; the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the jury could reconcile findings of excessive force and qualified immunity based on the officer's reasonable but mistaken belief the suspect was armed.

Siglar v. Hightower

112 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997) · May 8, 1997

A prisoner's bruised and sore ear lasting three days constituted a de minimis injury insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim or to meet the physical injury requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act for mental or emotional suffering claims.

Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown

520 U.S. 397 (1997) · Apr 28, 1997

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a single hiring decision unless the plaintiff demonstrates that adequate screening of the applicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of hiring that applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's constitutional rights.

Baker v. Putnal

75 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1996) · Feb 15, 1996

Summary judgment was improperly granted on an excessive force claim where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether a police officer's shooting of an unarmed man was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Roberts v. City of Forest Acres

902 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.C. 1995) · Aug 21, 1995

The court denied summary judgment for the city and officer on excessive force and municipal liability claims where evidence showed an officer used force significantly disproportionate to the threat posed during a traffic stop, and the city had inadequate training and supervision of its officers regarding use of force.

Pyles v. Raisor

60 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1995) · Aug 1, 1995

The Sixth Circuit held that officers who used excessive force during an arrest were not entitled to qualified immunity, finding that the right to be free from gratuitous violence during an arrest was clearly established. The court also held that the plaintiff's failure to file a formal complaint did not preclude her § 1983 claim.

United States v. Wadley

No. 94-10573 (5th Cir. 1995) · Jul 13, 1995

Affirmed denial of motion to suppress, holding that officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant during a massive police undercover operation at a housing complex based on observed conduct consistent with narcotics activity.

Grossman v. City of Portland

33 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1994) · Sep 6, 1994

The Ninth Circuit held that a police officer who used excessive force during an encounter with a citizen was not entitled to qualified immunity, and that the City of Portland could be held liable under Monell if its policies or customs contributed to the constitutional violation. The court clarified the standards for municipal liability and individual officer liability in excessive force cases.

Adams v. Metiva

31 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 1994) · Aug 1, 1994

An officer who used excessive force during an arrest—including beating a suspect who was not resisting—was not entitled to qualified immunity, and the court established that the right to be free from excessive force during an arrest was clearly established in the Sixth Circuit, requiring a fact-intensive inquiry into the totality of the circumstances under Graham v. Connor.

Heck v. Humphrey

512 U.S. 477 (1994) · Jun 24, 1994

A § 1983 claim for damages is barred if success on that claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing criminal conviction — the conviction must first be reversed or invalidated.

Shaw v. Stroud

13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994) · Jan 6, 1994

A police supervisor can be held liable under § 1983 for a subordinate's use of excessive force where the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge of a pervasive pattern of misconduct, was deliberately indifferent to the risk, and there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the constitutional injury.

Northington v. Jackson

973 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1992) · Aug 17, 1992

The Tenth Circuit established important procedural standards for § 1983 excessive force claims, holding that pro se complaints must be liberally construed and that dismissal without allowing amendment is improper when the plaintiff has alleged facts supporting constitutional violations by law enforcement.

Townsend v. State

813 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991) · Jun 27, 1991

Affirmed DWI conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant's consent to a breath test was voluntary, and that an officer's observation of weaving between lanes provided reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.

Pfannstiel v. City of Marion

918 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1990) · Dec 12, 1990

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether they used excessive force and conducted unlawful searches during a confrontation with citizens in Marion, Texas.

Graham v. Connor

490 U.S. 386 (1989) · May 15, 1989

All claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard — not substantive due process.

Meade v. Grubbs

841 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988) · Mar 11, 1988

The Tenth Circuit established important standards for evaluating pro se prisoner civil rights complaints, holding that courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings and that a pro se plaintiff alleging physical violence and denial of medical care by sheriff's deputies states cognizable claims under § 1983. The court also addressed qualified immunity standards for law enforcement officers accused of excessive force.

City of Houston v. Hill

482 U.S. 451 (1987) · Jun 15, 1987

A municipal ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of duty is substantially overbroad under the First Amendment because it criminalizes a significant amount of constitutionally protected speech and accords police unconstitutional enforcement discretion.

Lynch v. Cannatella

810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987) · Feb 27, 1987

Even excludable aliens physically present in the United States are entitled to due process protection from gross physical abuse by state or federal officials — and harbor police who subjected Jamaican stowaways to beatings, hosing, forced labor, and drugging could not claim qualified immunity.

Kentucky v. Graham

473 U.S. 159 (1985) · Jun 28, 1985

Personal-capacity suits seek to hold an officer personally liable; official-capacity suits are really suits against the government entity itself — and fee liability under § 1988 runs with merits liability, not against non-parties.

Tennessee v. Garner

471 U.S. 1 (1985) · Mar 27, 1985

Police may not use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect unless the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.

Raley v. Fraser

747 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1984) · Nov 26, 1984

Where an officer used four choke holds and caused bruises and scrapes during an arrest for public intoxication, the force constituted assault and battery under state law but did not rise to the level of a Section 1983 excessive force violation under then-existing precedent requiring severe injuries.

McKinley v. City of Eloy

705 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1983) · May 9, 1983

The Ninth Circuit held that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 for inadequate police training and supervision that amounts to deliberate indifference, and that officers' use of deadly force was constitutionally excessive where the suspect did not pose an immediate threat.

Lewis v. City of New Orleans

415 U.S. 130 (1974) · Feb 20, 1974

A New Orleans ordinance making it unlawful to curse, revile, or use obscene or opprobrious language toward a police officer is facially overbroad in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

United States v. Morris

477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1973) · Apr 17, 1973

Affirmed conviction for possession of an unregistered automatic rifle, holding that the seizure of the weapon was incident to a lawful arrest and that the registration requirements of the National Firearms Act did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Terry v. Ohio

392 U.S. 1 (1968) · Jun 10, 1968

A police officer may briefly stop and pat down a person for weapons if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity and may be armed and dangerous.