Pleading Standard Cases

Degenhardt v. Bintliff

No. 24-40034 (5th Cir. 2024) · Sep 24, 2024

Brothers stated a Fourth Amendment claim that a traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion, but officers were entitled to qualified immunity on claims regarding vehicle impoundment and First Amendment retaliation for laughing and smirking during the encounter.

Barrera v. City of Irving

No. 3:24-CV-0177 (N.D. Tex.) · Jan 25, 2024

Pending civil rights action alleging excessive force and municipal liability against the City of Irving and its officers.

Bevill v. Fletcher

26 F.4th 270 (5th Cir. 2022) · Feb 11, 2022

A police captain's First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 survived a motion to dismiss where the complaint plausibly alleged that a judge, district attorney, and sheriff conspired to have him fired in retaliation for signing an affidavit critical of their professional relationships.

Stephenson v. McClelland

No. 3:20-CV-3599-S (N.D. Tex.) · Jan 1, 2022

Addressed qualified immunity and pleading standards in a § 1983 excessive force and false arrest case, emphasizing the plaintiff's burden to allege facts sufficient to overcome the qualified immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage.

Esquivel v. Eastburn

No. SA-20-CV-00377-OLG (W.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2021) · Apr 28, 2021

A pro se plaintiff's § 1983 claims against state troopers for unlawful arrest, illegal search, and excessive force survived initial screening but were subject to dismissal where the plaintiff failed to state plausible claims against certain defendants.

Kostic v. Texas A&M University at Commerce

No. 3:19-CV-2865 (N.D. Tex.) · Jun 15, 2020

A university employee's due process and First Amendment claims were dismissed where she failed to allege facts sufficient to overcome the university's Eleventh Amendment immunity and failed to identify a final policymaker for Monell liability purposes.

Rose v. Herrera

No. EP-17-CV-00289 (W.D. Tex.) · Mar 15, 2018

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage where the plaintiff alleged officers used excessive force during an arrest, and the factual allegations, taken as true, stated a plausible Fourth Amendment violation.

Peña v. City of Rio Grande City

879 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2018) · Jan 12, 2018

The district court erred in disregarding a plaintiff's proposed amended complaint; when the amended complaint stated plausible excessive force claims against officers who tased a woman during a family dispute, the case should proceed to qualified immunity analysis.

Ziglar v. Abbasi

582 U.S. 120 (2017) · Jun 19, 2017

The Court severely limited the Bivens implied damages remedy, holding that courts should not extend it to new contexts — and that post-9/11 detention policy claims present such a new context.

Childers v. Iglesias

848 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2017) · Feb 9, 2017

A rancher's § 1983 false arrest claim was properly dismissed where the facts alleged in the complaint established that the officer had probable cause to arrest for interfering with police duties, even though the charges were later dropped.

Johnson v. City of Shelby

574 U.S. 10 (2014) · Nov 10, 2014

A § 1983 complaint need not invoke § 1983 by name — federal pleading rules require only a short and plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to relief, not citation to specific statutes.

Wafer v. Molina

No. 3:14-CV-0976-M-BH (N.D. Tex. 2014) · Jun 13, 2014

Recommended dismissal of § 1983 false arrest and unlawful detention claims as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), holding that official-capacity claims against officers are treated as claims against the municipality, that police departments are not suable entities, and that a county jail is not a legal entity capable of being sued.

Jabary v. City of Allen

No. 12-41054 (5th Cir. 2013) · Nov 25, 2013

A business owner stated a procedural due process claim where city officials revoked his Certificate of Occupancy without adequate pre-deprivation process, but failed to state substantive due process, equal protection, or conspiracy claims.

Barrios-Barrios v. Clipps

825 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. La. 2011) · Oct 20, 2011

Section 1983 excessive force and unlawful detention claims arising from a police encounter in New Orleans; the court analyzed the claims under the Graham v. Connor objective reasonableness standard and addressed qualified immunity for the individual officers.

Walters v. McMahen

795 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D. Md. 2011) · Jul 14, 2011

Dismissed civil RICO class action alleging that corporate employees conspired to hire illegal immigrants to depress wages, holding that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars conspiracy claims among employees of the same corporation acting within the scope of their employment.

Gentilello v. Rege

627 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2010) · Dec 1, 2010

A tenured professor who was demoted from administrative chair positions failed to state a due process claim under § 1983 because he did not adequately plead a constitutionally protected property interest in the chair positions beyond his underlying tenured professorship.

Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.

560 U.S. 538 (2010) · Jun 7, 2010

Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), whether an amended complaint naming a new defendant relates back depends on what the new defendant knew or should have known during the Rule 4(m) period, not on what the plaintiff knew or how long the plaintiff waited to amend.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal

556 U.S. 662 (2009) · May 18, 2009

A complaint must plead facts that make a claim plausible, not merely possible — conclusory allegations and legal labels are not enough.

Erickson v. Pardus

551 U.S. 89 (2007) · Jun 4, 2007

Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, not specific facts, and a pro se complaint must be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than a pleading drafted by a lawyer.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

550 U.S. 544 (2007) · May 21, 2007

A complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face — bare assertions and conclusory allegations are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n

987 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993) · Apr 5, 1993

A district court may not dismiss a complaint at a pretrial conference without providing the procedural protections required by Rule 56 if the dismissal effectively constitutes summary judgment; leave to amend should be freely given when justice requires under Foman v. Davis.

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit

507 U.S. 163 (1993) · Mar 3, 1993

Federal courts may not apply a heightened pleading standard to § 1983 claims alleging municipal liability — the ordinary notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule 8(a)(2) apply.

Foman v. Davis

371 U.S. 178 (1962) · Dec 3, 1962

Leave to amend a pleading under Rule 15(a) should be freely given when justice so requires, and should not be denied absent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of the amendment.