Winegarner v. City of Irving
No. 3:24-CV-02171-K-BT (N.D. Tex. 2025)
Holding
Magistrate Judge recommended granting all motions to dismiss: Irving Police Department dismissed as a non-suable entity; City of Irving's Monell liability claims dismissed for failure to identify a specific policy, custom, or training failure; officers' qualified immunity defense sustained on excessive force, wrongful arrest, and malicious prosecution claims; Title VI claim dismissed for failure to allege intentional discrimination.
What This Case Is About
Winegarner v. City of Irving is a pro se § 1983 civil rights action filed against the City of Irving, the Irving Police Department, and four individual officers (Preston Hammel, Travis Reyes, Justin Ivey, and John Phillips). The plaintiff alleged excessive force, wrongful arrest, and malicious prosecution arising from his August 23, 2022 arrest. The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of all claims.
The Facts
Plaintiff David Winegarner, proceeding pro se, alleged that during his August 23, 2022 arrest, the four officer defendants used “unlawful and unreasonable excessive force” by placing his “head up under [the] steering wheel, with [his seatbelt] harness on [his] left shoulder, choking [his] throat [while] both of [the officers’] knees [were] on [his] back.” Winegarner contended the force was excessive because he was not resisting arrest.
Three separate motions to dismiss were filed: (1) by the Irving Police Department, arguing it is not a separate legal entity; (2) by the City of Irving, arguing failure to plead Monell liability; and (3) by the four officers, asserting qualified immunity.
What the Court Decided
Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford recommended granting all three motions to dismiss:
Irving Police Department dismissed. IPD is not a separate legal entity with jural authority capable of being sued under § 1983. In Texas, a police department is merely a department of the city government, not a separate suable entity.
City of Irving claims dismissed under Monell. The plaintiff failed to plead a plausible claim for municipal liability. His allegations did not identify a specific official policy, a pattern of similar violations, or a particular training failure. Conclusory allegations of inadequate training and supervision are insufficient under Iqbal and Twombly.
Officers’ qualified immunity sustained. On the excessive force claim, the court applied the Graham v. Connor objective reasonableness factors. The officers asserted qualified immunity, and the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of showing both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time. The wrongful arrest claim failed because the plaintiff did not adequately allege the absence of probable cause. The malicious prosecution claim also failed.
Title VI claim dismissed. The plaintiff’s Title VI claim failed because he did not allege intentional discrimination based on race, color, or national origin—a required element for Title VI liability.
Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case
Don’t sue the police department—sue the city. Texas police departments and sheriff’s offices are not suable entities. The proper defendant for municipal liability is the city or county.
Specific Monell facts are essential. This case reinforces that you must identify a concrete policy, custom, or training deficiency—not just allege that the city “failed to train” or “failed to supervise.” You need specific facts about what was deficient and how it caused your injury.
Qualified immunity burden falls on the plaintiff. Once officers assert qualified immunity, you bear the burden of demonstrating both that a constitutional violation occurred and that the right was clearly established. Generic allegations of excessive force, without specific facts about what force was used, why it was unreasonable, and what clearly established law it violated, will not survive a motion to dismiss.
Pro se plaintiffs face the same substantive standards. While pro se complaints are construed liberally, they must still meet the plausibility pleading standard. Courts will not fill in factual gaps for you.
Title VI requires intentional discrimination. If you’re bringing a race discrimination claim alongside your § 1983 claims, you must allege specific facts showing intentional discrimination—not just that force was used and you are a member of a protected class.
Key Takeaway
Winegarner v. City of Irving demonstrates how all three categories of § 1983 defendants—the police department, the city, and individual officers—can each defeat claims through different legal mechanisms. Plaintiffs must (1) name the right entity, (2) plead specific Monell facts for municipal liability, and (3) identify clearly established law to overcome qualified immunity. Pro se plaintiffs are held to the same substantive standards, even with liberal construction of their pleadings.