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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

550 U.S. 544 (2007)

Court: U.S. Supreme Court
Decided: May 21, 2007
Docket: 05-1126
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Holding

A complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face — bare assertions and conclusory allegations are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

What Happened

After the breakup of AT&T in 1984, a handful of regional telephone monopolies — the “Baby Bells” — dominated local phone service across America. When the Telecommunications Act of 1996 opened these markets to competition, the Baby Bells were supposed to share their networks with upstart competitors called CLECs (competitive local exchange carriers). But the new competitors found the going rough. The Baby Bells allegedly made it as hard as possible for CLECs to use their networks — overcharging them, providing inferior connections, and sabotaging their relationships with customers.

William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus, representing a class of phone and internet subscribers, sued the Baby Bells under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Their theory: the regional monopolies had secretly agreed not to compete with each other and to collectively squash the CLECs. The evidence? All the Baby Bells were doing the same thing — resisting competition — and none of them were expanding into each other’s territories despite obvious business opportunities. One CEO even said that competing in a rival’s territory “might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that doesn’t make it right.”

The Baby Bells moved to dismiss, arguing that parallel behavior alone doesn’t prove a conspiracy. The District Court agreed and dismissed. The Second Circuit reversed, applying the old standard from Conley v. Gibson (1957): a complaint shouldn’t be dismissed unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts” supporting their claim.

What the Court Decided

The Supreme Court reversed in a 7-2 decision written by Justice Souter, fundamentally reshaping how federal courts evaluate complaints at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The Court held that a complaint must contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” liability — not merely allege it in conclusory terms. This is the “plausibility” standard.

The Court retired the famous “no set of facts” language from Conley v. Gibson, calling it “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.” Under the new framework, allegations of parallel conduct — without additional facts suggesting an actual agreement — stop “short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” 550 U.S. at 557.

The Court emphasized the practical stakes: letting thin complaints survive to discovery could impose enormous costs on defendants, especially in complex cases where discovery is expensive and expansive. The threat of discovery expense could pressure defendants into settling even weak claims. Requiring plausible allegations at the pleading stage serves as a gatekeeper against these costs.

Applying this standard, the Court found that the Baby Bells’ parallel behavior was equally consistent with rational, independent business decisions as with conspiracy. Each company had its own reasons to resist competition and to stay in its own territory. Without “further factual enhancement,” the complaint didn’t cross the line from possible to plausible. 550 U.S. at 557.

What It Means in Practice

Twombly changed the rules for every federal civil case, but its impact on § 1983 litigation has been particularly significant. Before Twombly, a plaintiff could file a relatively bare-bones complaint and count on discovery to fill in the details. After Twombly, the complaint itself must tell a plausible story.

For civil rights plaintiffs, this creates a structural disadvantage. The facts you need — body camera footage, use-of-force reports, internal affairs files, dispatch records, training records — are almost always in the government’s exclusive possession. You can’t get them without discovery, but you can’t get to discovery without pleading enough facts to make your claims plausible. It’s a Catch-22 that Twombly’s successor, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, would make even more acute.

Twombly also gave defendants a powerful new weapon: the motion to dismiss. Before Twombly, these motions were harder to win. After Twombly, courts gained broad discretion to evaluate whether a complaint’s factual allegations “plausibly” support liability — or whether they’re equally consistent with innocent explanations.

How You Can Use It

Despite being defense-friendly, Twombly gives you a clear roadmap for surviving dismissal:

How It Can Be Used Against You

Twombly is the foundation on which virtually every motion to dismiss a § 1983 complaint is built. Defendants will:

How to counter: Plead specific, concrete facts about what happened to you. Allege what you personally witnessed and experienced. Where critical evidence is in the defendant’s exclusive control (body camera footage, internal records), say so in your complaint — some courts recognize that the plausibility standard should be applied with greater flexibility when relevant facts are asymmetrically held.

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