Tarver v. City of Edna

What This Case Is About

Fred Tarver, a grandfather, was handcuffed and placed in a police car during a custody dispute between his son and daughter-in-law. Tarver alleged that Officer Bubela slammed the police car door on his foot and then on his head. The Fifth Circuit held the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the arrest and handcuffing claims but that genuine fact issues precluded immunity on the door-slamming claims.

The Facts

A marital dispute between Freddie and Christina Tarver culminated with Freddie taking their two-year-old son Dylan to his parents’ (Fred and Vera Tarver’s) house. When Christina tried to retrieve Dylan from the grandparents’ daycare center, Vera fled with the child. Officers responded and determined Dylan should be returned to his mother.

The parties disputed what happened next. The officers claimed Tarver repeatedly refused to relinquish Dylan and told them to arrest him. Tarver denied this. During the arrest, the officers handcuffed Tarver—linking two pairs of handcuffs together because of his size—and placed him in the back of a police car.

Because the car’s air conditioning was off, Tarver became distressed. He tapped on the window with his feet. When Vera opened the door to check on him, Officer Bubela allegedly rushed over and slammed the door on Tarver’s foot. Later, when Freddie opened the door because Tarver was red-faced and sweating, Bubela allegedly slammed the door on Tarver’s head. Multiple witnesses testified that Bubela repeatedly responded “I don’t care” when told about Tarver’s medical conditions.

What the Court Decided

The Fifth Circuit reversed and dismissed in part, affirmed and remanded in part:

Unlawful arrest: The officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Even if Tarver was arrested rather than merely detained, a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed—the officers were confronted with a custody dispute where a non-parent appeared to be interfering with a mother’s custodial rights.

Handcuffing: Tarver’s “acute contusions of the wrist” were de minimis injuries insufficient to support an excessive force claim. The court emphasized that handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive force.

Door-slamming: Genuine fact issues precluded qualified immunity. Under Tarver’s version—supported by multiple witnesses—Bubela intentionally and angrily slammed the car door on Tarver’s foot and head while he was handcuffed, had medical conditions, and posed no threat. The Graham factors weighed in Tarver’s favor: minimal severity of crime, no immediate threat, and no risk of escape.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Handcuff injuries are usually de minimis. Bruising or soreness from handcuffs alone, without evidence of intent to inflict harm or resulting significant injury, will not support an excessive force claim.

Force against restrained, non-threatening detainees is closely scrutinized. When a suspect is already handcuffed and secured in a vehicle, the justification for any additional force is minimal. Intentionally slamming a car door on a restrained person may constitute clearly excessive force.

Witness testimony creates fact issues. When multiple witnesses contradict the officer’s version of events—particularly regarding the officer’s demeanor and intent—the case will likely survive summary judgment and go to trial.

Reasonable but mistaken arrests are protected. Officers who reasonably conclude that probable cause exists are protected by qualified immunity even if their conclusion is ultimately wrong.

Key Takeaway

While handcuffing during a lawful arrest rarely constitutes excessive force, the legal calculus changes dramatically when officers use additional force against a handcuffed, non-threatening detainee. Slamming a car door on a restrained person’s body—particularly when witnesses describe the officer as angry and dismissive of the detainee’s medical needs—raises genuine fact issues about whether the force was objectively reasonable. Such disputes cannot be resolved at summary judgment and must go to trial.