Malley v. Briggs

What Happened

In December 1980, Rhode Island State Police were conducting a court-authorized wiretap on a man named Paul Driscoll. They intercepted a phone call from someone calling himself “Dr. Shogun” who mentioned “toking” in front of “Jimmy Briggs” and passing something to “Louisa.” Another call referenced a party at “Jaime’s parents’ home” — meaning James and Louisa Briggs’s home.

Trooper Edward Malley, the officer in charge, interpreted the calls as evidence of marijuana possession. Based on these two intercepted conversations — and nothing more — Malley prepared felony drug complaints against the Briggses. He presented the complaints, unsigned arrest warrants, and supporting affidavits to a state judge, who signed the warrants.

The Briggses, prominent members of their community with no criminal history, were arrested at their home before six in the morning. They were booked, held for several hours, arraigned, and released. Local and statewide newspapers published their arrests. The grand jury declined to indict, and all charges were dropped.

The Briggses sued under § 1983, alleging that Malley’s affidavit — based on ambiguous wiretap conversations about drug slang — failed to establish probable cause and violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

What the Court Decided

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision by Justice White, held that police officers who apply for arrest warrants are entitled to qualified immunity — not absolute immunity. This was an important clarification because Malley had argued he should receive absolute immunity (like a prosecutor) for the quasi-judicial act of presenting a warrant application.

The Court rejected absolute immunity for three reasons:

1. Complaining witnesses were not absolutely immune at common law
2. The officer’s function in seeking a warrant is “further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings” than a prosecutor’s
3. Qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”

On the merits of qualified immunity, the Court announced the critical test: “the question is whether a reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner’s position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.” If so, the application was “not objectively reasonable, because it created the unnecessary danger of an unlawful arrest.”

The Court also rejected the argument that a magistrate’s decision to sign the warrant automatically shields the officer: “ours is not an ideal system, and it is possible that a magistrate, working under docket pressures, will fail to perform as a magistrate should.”

What It Means in Practice

Malley v. Briggs is foundational for two reasons:

First, it coined the most-quoted formulation of qualified immunity: “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” This phrase appears in virtually every qualified immunity decision. It’s the baseline — officers who are plainly incompetent get no protection.

Second, it established that a judge’s signature on a warrant does not immunize the officer who applied for it. If the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause that no reasonable officer would have submitted it, the officer is liable despite the warrant. This is critically important in cases involving fabricated or misleading warrant affidavits.

How You Can Use It

• Challenge a facially deficient warrant affidavit: If the affidavit supporting your arrest warrant was so thin that no competent officer would have relied on it, cite Malley. The officer cannot hide behind the magistrate’s signature.
• Key quote: “Only where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable will the shield of immunity be lost.” 475 U.S. at 344-345.
• “Plainly incompetent” standard: “As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 475 U.S. at 341. Use this in any QI briefing.
• Template: “Under Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986), an officer’s application for a warrant is not objectively reasonable when a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. Here, [describe deficiency in affidavit].”
• Pair with Franks v. Delaware: If the affidavit contained deliberate falsehoods, use Franks to void the warrant and Malley to defeat qualified immunity.

How It Can Be Used Against You

• “Officers of reasonable competence could disagree”: If the probable cause question is close — if reasonable officers could disagree about whether the affidavit was sufficient — the officer gets immunity. Malley protects “mistaken judgments.”
• Magistrate’s determination as evidence: Justice Powell’s concurrence argued that the magistrate’s probable cause finding should receive “substantial evidentiary weight.” Many lower courts give significant deference to the fact that a judge reviewed the affidavit.
• Subjective good faith: While Malley applies an objective standard, defendants will argue that the officer genuinely believed the facts in the affidavit were true, which bolsters the reasonableness argument.

How to counter: Focus on the objective deficiency of the affidavit. Compare it to what a “reasonably well-trained officer” would have submitted. If the affidavit omits exculpatory information, contains material misrepresentations, or draws unreasonable inferences from thin evidence, argue that no competent officer would have submitted it.