Terry v. Ohio

What Happened

On the afternoon of October 31, 1963, Detective Martin McFadden — a 39-year veteran of the Cleveland police force — was patrolling downtown when he noticed two men, John Terry and Richard Chilton, acting suspiciously. McFadden watched as each man walked past a store, paused to peer through the window, then continued down the block, turned around, and walked past the store again. They repeated this ritual roughly five or six times each, pausing each time to confer with each other at the corner. A third man, Carl Katz, joined them briefly before walking away.

McFadden, drawing on decades of experience, suspected the men were “casing” the store for a robbery. He approached the three men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked their names. When they “mumbled something” in response, McFadden grabbed Terry, spun him around, and patted down the outside of his clothing. He felt a pistol in Terry’s overcoat pocket. Unable to remove it right there, McFadden ordered all three inside the store, where he removed a .38 caliber revolver from Terry and a revolver from Chilton. Katz was unarmed.

Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. Terry moved to suppress the gun, arguing that McFadden had no probable cause for an arrest or search. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that McFadden had the right to pat down the men for his own safety. Terry was convicted.

What the Court Decided

In an 8-1 decision written by Chief Justice Warren, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to conduct a brief investigatory stop and a limited pat-down search for weapons, even without probable cause for arrest, when the officer has “reasonable suspicion” based on “specific and articulable facts” that criminal activity is afoot and the person may be armed and dangerous.

The Court acknowledged that a stop-and-frisk is a “search and seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. But it held that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard doesn’t always require probable cause — a lesser standard of “reasonable suspicion” suffices for the brief, limited intrusion of a Terry stop.

The search had to be limited in scope. An officer conducting a pat-down may only search for weapons — not for evidence. The search must be a “carefully limited search of the outer clothing” to discover “weapons which might be used to assault him.” 392 U.S. at 30. The officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the intrusion. 392 U.S. at 21.

The Court balanced two competing interests: the government’s interest in “effective crime prevention and detection” and the individual’s interest in personal security. On the facts, McFadden’s decades of experience, his careful observations, and the men’s suspicious conduct gave him enough basis to reasonably suspect a robbery was being planned.

What It Means in Practice

Terry is one of the most consequential cases in criminal law and civil rights. It created the legal framework for the millions of “stop and frisk” encounters that occur between police and civilians every year. For § 1983 plaintiffs, Terry cuts both ways.

On one hand, Terry sets limits on police power. An officer cannot stop you without reasonable suspicion. A pat-down must be limited to a search for weapons. Exceeding these limits is a Fourth Amendment violation actionable under § 1983. On the other hand, Terry gave police a powerful tool that’s been widely criticized for its racially disparate application — as documented in litigation over New York’s stop-and-frisk program and in DOJ investigations of numerous police departments.

Terry also established the “reasonable suspicion” standard that later cases expanded well beyond street encounters. Today, Terry stops justify everything from traffic stops to border detentions to airport security encounters. The case is the foundation upon which later cases like Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor built the framework for analyzing police use of force under the Fourth Amendment.

How You Can Use It

Terry provides the standard for challenging unlawful stops and frisks:

• No reasonable suspicion = unlawful stop. If the officer cannot articulate specific facts that justified the stop, the stop violates the Fourth Amendment. A “hunch” isn’t enough. 392 U.S. at 22.
• Key quote: “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” 392 U.S. at 27.
• Scope limits. Even if the stop was lawful, the pat-down must be limited to a search for weapons. If the officer went beyond the outer clothing, reached into pockets without feeling a weapon-like object, or searched for drugs or evidence rather than weapons, the search exceeded Terry’s scope.
• Template: “Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), a stop-and-frisk must be justified by ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the intrusion. Here, the officer could point to no such facts. [Describe the absence of reasonable suspicion.]”
• Challenge pretextual stops. When officers use minor traffic violations or vague “suspicious behavior” to justify stops motivated by racial profiling, Terry’s requirement of articulable, particularized facts can expose the pretext.

How It Can Be Used Against You

Terry also works for the defense:

• Low threshold. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. Officers need only point to “specific and articulable facts” — and courts give officers broad latitude in interpreting conduct as suspicious. High-crime area + late hour + “furtive movements” has been held sufficient in many circuits.
• Officer experience. Courts routinely credit an officer’s “training and experience” in interpreting ambiguous behavior as suspicious. What might look innocent to a layperson can be recast as suspicious by an experienced officer.
• Expanding scope. Courts have gradually expanded what counts as a Terry stop, including prolonged detentions, use of handcuffs, and drawing weapons — all justified under the rubric of “officer safety.”

How to counter: Demand specifics. What exactly did the officer see? When? Why did it suggest criminal activity? Generic recitations about “high-crime areas” and “furtive movements” should be challenged with data. If the officer’s justification for the stop is vague, conclusory, or relies on factors that apply to everyone in the neighborhood, the stop likely lacked reasonable suspicion.