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Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls

614 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2010)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Decided: August 9, 2010
Docket: 09-10313
Officers named: Chief Ken Coughlin

Holding

Affirmed summary judgment for the City where the police chief was found to be a policymaker but the plaintiff failed to establish a custom or policy of unconstitutional plain-view seizures; articulated standards for failure-to-train liability requiring specificity about how the training program was defective.

What This Case Is About

Dr. Allen Zarnow was a physician and licensed firearms dealer whose office was searched after Clinic employees found firearms, ammunition, and blasting caps (none were active explosives). Police obtained a search warrant for his home, and during the search, officers seized items far beyond what the warrant authorized—including currency, bonds, silver, books, and medications—under an expansive and incorrect interpretation of the “plain view” doctrine. Zarnow sued the City of Wichita Falls under § 1983, alleging municipal liability for the officers’ unconstitutional seizure practices. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City, finding that while the police chief was a policymaker, Zarnow failed to establish a custom or policy.

The Facts

In July 1999, while Dr. Zarnow was on vacation, Clinic employees discovered firearms, ammunition, blasting caps, and fuses in his office. None were active explosive devices. The Clinic’s manager called police, who concluded the items were “dangerous” and contacted ATF. Police Chief Ken Coughlin arrived at the scene.

Police applied for a warrant to search Zarnow’s home based on an affidavit alleging “possession of illegal explosives and explosive devices.” While waiting for the warrant, officers surrounded Zarnow’s home and ordered him outside when he returned from vacation. Zarnow told officers he was a licensed firearms dealer and offered to show his paperwork.

Officers accompanied Zarnow inside, where he produced papers proving he was licensed to possess the materials. As he showed the documents to an ATF agent, officers began a consensual search. When they found a box marked “explosives” in plain view, Zarnow withdrew consent and asked officers to leave. They informed him they had a warrant.

During the searches, officers seized items far beyond the warrant’s scope—weapons, ammunition, currency, bonds, silver, band-aids, books, prescription medicines, and over-the-counter medications. Officers testified they believed “plain view” permitted seizing any item that might be evidence of any crime. Chief Coughlin testified it was his practice to “seize more than was necessary during an initial search, so that he could later ‘rule things in or out.’”

The next morning, Chief Coughlin assembled all seized firearms and ammunition and laid them out for the news media to photograph. A grand jury refused to indict, and no charges were ever brought.

What the Court Decided

The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City on all claims.

Policymaker status – Found. The court agreed that Chief Coughlin was a policymaker. While the City Charter placed the police department under the city manager’s supervision, the court found no evidence that the city manager or council had ever commented on internal police procedures. The chief’s power to issue binding “General Orders” establishing police policy, combined with the marginal involvement of others in internal police operations, demonstrated that the City impliedly delegated policymaking authority to the chief.

Pattern of unconstitutional conduct – Not established. Zarnow failed to show a pattern. The only evidence of the improper plain-view interpretation came from this single incident. Zarnow invited the court to infer that because officers testified about the doctrine years later, many similar searches must have occurred—but the court rejected this as “improbable inference” and “unsupported speculation.”

Single policymaker act – Waived. Zarnow argued for the first time on appeal that the chief personally participated in the unconstitutional seizures. Because this argument was not raised below, it was waived.

Failure to train – Not established. The court held that “[a] plaintiff must allege with specificity how a particular training program is defective.” Zarnow’s only evidence was that officers expressed an unlawful view of the plain-view doctrine. The City’s training complied with state requirements, which the court considered a factor against finding inadequacy.

Ratification – Not established. The court held that good-faith statements made in defending litigation do not constitute ratification of unconstitutional conduct.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

A policymaker is not enough. Even proving that the police chief is a final policymaker does not establish municipal liability. You still need to show an unconstitutional policy or custom and that it was the moving force behind your injury.

Pattern evidence requires similarity and specificity. A single incident—no matter how egregious—generally cannot establish a custom. You need evidence of multiple similar incidents over time. Speculation that other incidents “must have” occurred is insufficient.

Failure-to-train claims require specificity. You must identify specific deficiencies in the training program and explain how proper training would have prevented the violation. Compliance with state training requirements weighs against your claim.

Raise all arguments in the trial court. The court refused to consider Zarnow’s argument that the chief personally committed the violation because it was raised for the first time on appeal. Preserve all arguments below.

Defending litigation is not ratification. A city’s defense of its officers in litigation—even when the officers’ conduct was later found unconstitutional—does not constitute ratification of the unconstitutional conduct for Monell purposes.

Key Takeaway

Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls demonstrates that proving municipal liability requires much more than showing that an officer—even the police chief—violated the Constitution. You must establish either a formal policy or a persistent pattern of similar violations, and failure-to-train claims must identify specific training deficiencies with particularity. A single incident of misconduct, even one involving the chief’s direct participation, will not establish municipal liability if the proper arguments are not raised and evidence of a pattern is lacking.

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