Spencer v. Rau

What This Case Is About

A retired military nurse stopped at a highway accident scene at 2:30 a.m. to render aid. When two off-duty San Antonio police officers also responded, an argument ensued about safety at the scene. After the nurse refused repeated orders to leave, shoved an officer, and broke free from the officer’s grip, he was arrested for interfering with public duties. The court granted summary judgment for the officers on all federal and state law claims.

The Facts

After leaving work, Spencer came upon a car accident on IH-35 at 2:30 a.m. He parked across the interstate, crossed the highway, and assessed the accident victims. Officers Muniz and Rau arrived and began securing the scene. They ordered Spencer—who was standing in a dark traffic lane on the interstate—to return to his vehicle at least three times. Spencer refused, identifying himself as a nurse and lecturing the officers about his qualifications.

Spencer asked for the officers’ names and badge numbers, then continued arguing about safety procedures. When Officer Rau grabbed Spencer’s left arm to make an arrest, Spencer broke free and shoved Rau away. Rau grabbed Spencer’s right arm a second time, applied an arm bar technique, placed Spencer’s arms behind his back, handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest. Force ceased immediately upon handcuffing. Spencer alleged soft tissue injuries. The charges were dismissed ten days later.

What the Court Decided

The court granted summary judgment on all claims:

False arrest: Probable cause existed. Spencer violated Texas Penal Code § 38.15 (interfering with public duties) by refusing officers’ orders to leave a traffic lane while they were securing an accident scene, and by physically resisting. The court noted an uncharged offense need not be related to the stated arrest charge under Devenpeck v. Alford.

Excessive force: Under Graham v. Connor, the force was proportionate. Spencer admitted to shoving the officer and breaking free. The officers used only enough force to handcuff him and stopped immediately upon success. His soft tissue injuries were insufficient to support an excessive force finding.

Failure to intervene: Because no excessive force occurred, there was nothing for either officer to intervene against. Under Hale v. Townley, the prerequisite for bystander liability is the existence of unconstitutional force.

Malicious prosecution: Both failed—the federal claim because malicious prosecution alone does not state a constitutional violation, and the state claim because probable cause existed.

Official immunity (state law): The officers acted in good faith within their discretionary duties. A reasonably prudent officer could have believed probable cause existed and the force was justified.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Good intentions don’t override lawful orders. Even if you are a trained professional trying to help, refusing repeated police orders to leave a scene creates probable cause for arrest under statutes prohibiting interference with public duties.

Physical resistance forecloses excessive force claims. When you shove an officer and break free, the subsequent force used to complete the arrest will almost certainly be found reasonable, especially if it stops once you are handcuffed.

Dismissed charges don’t prove false arrest. The fact that charges were later dropped is irrelevant to the probable cause analysis—what matters is whether a reasonable officer had sufficient facts to believe an offense was being committed at the time of arrest.

Key Takeaway

When officers order you to leave a scene for safety reasons and you refuse, argue, and then physically resist when they attempt to arrest you, probable cause exists and the resulting force to complete the arrest is almost certainly reasonable. Your professional qualifications and good intentions do not give you the right to override lawful police orders, and physically resisting will both create probable cause and justify proportionate force in response.