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Sligh v. City of Conroe

No. 22-40518 (5th Cir. 2023)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Decided: November 21, 2023
Docket: 22-40518
Officers named: Officer Tyson Sutton, Deputy Alexis Alias Montes

Holding

While siccing a police dog on a suicidal woman who was not suspected of any crime and posed no threat to officers constituted excessive force, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established under the specific circumstances, which involved active resistance followed by unintentionally prolonged canine force.

What This Case Is About

Olivia Sligh’s partner called 911 to report that she was suicidal, had hurt herself, and had left the house on foot. He requested an ambulance and indicated she was unarmed and not violent. Police responded with a K9 unit and sicced the dog on Sligh after she resisted being physically restrained. The Fifth Circuit found the force was likely excessive but held the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established under these specific facts.

The Facts

At 1:39 a.m. on July 5, 2018, officers responded to a mental health crisis call. Officer Sutton brought Thor, a trained K9 police dog. When officers located Sligh, Sutton shined a flashlight in her face while Thor barked and lunged at her. Deputy Montes grabbed Sligh, who pulled away. Bodycam footage showed Sligh shouting profanities, slapping at Montes’s arms, and physically struggling for about 11 seconds before breaking free from his grip.

Sutton then released Thor with a bite command—without warning Sligh that a dog bite would follow if she did not comply. Thor bit Sligh in the upper thigh. Sutton began commanding Thor to release Sligh about eight seconds after the initial bite, but Thor did not immediately comply. Sutton pulled Thor’s collar about 36 seconds later. Thor released Sligh approximately 64 seconds after the first bite command.

Sligh suffered significant injuries. She was not suspected of any crime, was not armed, and officers had been told she was a mental health patient experiencing a crisis.

What the Court Decided

The Fifth Circuit applied the Graham v. Connor factors and found:

  1. Severity of crime: Weighed heavily in Sligh’s favor—she was not suspected of any crime.
  2. Immediate threat: Also favored Sligh—she did not pose a threat to officers, despite her self-harm. Using a dog bite to prevent self-harm was counterproductive.
  3. Active resistance: Weighed against Sligh—bodycam showed she physically resisted and broke free from Montes.

Despite finding a likely constitutional violation, the court held the right was not clearly established. The case was distinguishable from Cooper v. Brown (the leading dog-bite case) because Sligh actively resisted, and the prolonged bite was unintentional (Sutton tried to recall Thor). The court also affirmed dismissal of bystander liability (Montes), Monell claims (inadequate policy, failure to train, ratification), and ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Even unconstitutional force may be shielded by qualified immunity. The court found the force was likely excessive yet still granted immunity because no prior case with sufficiently similar facts clearly established the right.

Police dog deployment requires warning. The court emphasized the lack of warning before deploying the dog. Officers should provide clear warnings that a dog bite will follow non-compliance.

Mental health crisis calls shift the Graham analysis. When officers respond to a mental health crisis rather than a crime report, the first two Graham factors will typically favor the subject, making force harder to justify.

Unintentional prolongation of force may be treated differently. When an officer tries to recall a dog that disobeys, courts may treat the extended duration of force differently than deliberate prolongation.

Municipal liability requires more than one incident. The court rejected all three theories of municipal liability—inadequate policies, failure to train, and ratification—because Sligh could not show a pattern of similar incidents or deliberate indifference.

Key Takeaway

Deploying a police dog against a person in a mental health crisis who has not committed a crime and poses no threat to officers will likely be found excessive under Graham v. Connor. However, qualified immunity may still protect the officer if no prior case with sufficiently similar facts—particularly involving active resistance and unintentional prolongation of the bite—clearly established the right. This case highlights both the promise and limitations of excessive force doctrine in the context of mental health crisis response.

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