Miranda v. County of Lake
900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018)
Holding
The court clarified the standard for municipal liability under Monell, holding that a county could be liable under § 1983 for maintaining a widespread practice of excessive force where the practice was so pervasive that it constituted a de facto policy, and that private medical providers contracted by the county could not be shielded from § 1983 liability simply because they were not government employees.
Alfredo Miranda brought a § 1983 action against Lake County, Illinois, alleging that county officers used excessive force and that the county maintained a widespread practice that amounted to a de facto policy of tolerating such force. The case also raised the question of whether private entities contracted to provide services for the county could be held liable under § 1983.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Miranda v. County of Lake became one of the most cited § 1983 opinions in the circuit, with over 1,400 citations. The court provided an extensive analysis of Monell municipal liability, clarifying when a pattern of constitutional violations can establish a “widespread practice” sufficient to impose liability on a municipality. The court held that plaintiffs need not show a formal written policy; instead, evidence of repeated incidents of excessive force that were known to supervisors and left unaddressed can establish the kind of de facto custom that satisfies Monell.
The court also addressed the liability of private medical providers who contracted with the county, holding that when private entities perform traditional government functions—such as providing medical care to detainees—they can be treated as state actors for purposes of § 1983. This prevents municipalities from insulating themselves from liability simply by outsourcing government functions to private companies.
For pro se litigants, Miranda is essential reading on municipal liability. Its extensive analysis of when a “practice” becomes a “policy” provides a roadmap for building a case against a city or county. The decision demonstrates that you don’t need a smoking-gun written policy—a pattern of similar violations, combined with evidence that officials knew about and tolerated the conduct, can be enough to hold the municipality liable for damages.