Mesa v. Prejean
543 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2008)
Holding
Where factual disputes exist about whether an officer had probable cause to arrest someone for criminal trespass or disturbing the peace, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is inappropriate; protected speech cannot be the true basis for an arrest.
What This Case Is About
Mesa v. Prejean examines when factual disputes about probable cause prevent summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, particularly when a First Amendment retaliation claim is intertwined with a false arrest claim. The Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the officer on the wife’s claims while affirming it on the husband’s claims.
The Facts
On the night of April 8, 2005, Lafayette Police Officer Dwayne Prejean was patrolling the bar district in Lafayette, Louisiana. He visited establishments to have owners move tables and chairs obstructing sidewalks. After stopping at Guama’s Restaurant and Bar, owned by Rubens Mesa and Julieta Tarazona, Officer Prejean crossed the street and arrested a patron, Tyler Guilbeau, for disturbing the peace.
Mesa approached Prejean to discuss the sidewalk issue and inquire about Guilbeau’s arrest. Prejean told Mesa to wait on the sidewalk. Mesa complied by crossing the street. Tarazona then approached Prejean to ask about Guilbeau and the sidewalk demand. Prejean told Tarazona to move, though the parties dispute how many times and how clearly he gave this directive. Tarazona moved to the sidewalk but then turned back and made comments — either yelling about calling the Governor or saying, “If you didn’t have that badge you wouldn’t be treating me like that.”
Prejean immediately arrested Tarazona. When Mesa moved toward the scene, other officers subdued him, leaving him bleeding. Tarazona was forced to kneel and watch her husband being beaten. Both were charged criminally but acquitted at trial. They sued under § 1983.
What the Court Decided
The Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment on Tarazona’s false arrest and First Amendment claims but affirmed on Mesa’s claims and Tarazona’s excessive force claim.
Tarazona’s arrest: The court found genuine factual disputes about whether Tarazona violated the criminal trespass statute (which Louisiana courts have held does not apply to public sidewalks) and whether she was given reasonable time to comply. The court also found insufficient evidence that she was intoxicated.
First Amendment: The court held that if a jury finds no probable cause for Tarazona’s arrest, her First Amendment retaliation claim could proceed — the timing of the arrest (immediately after her critical comment) creates a fact question about whether protected speech was the real motivation. However, if probable cause exists, the objective standard forecloses inquiry into the officer’s subjective motivation.
Mesa’s claims: The court affirmed summary judgment because Mesa alleged only that Prejean failed to supervise the officers who subdued him — a supervisory liability theory requiring deliberate indifference, which a single brief incident could not establish.
Excessive force against Tarazona: Affirmed because Tarazona admitted the officer’s hand on her shoulder involved minimal force and she suffered no physical injury.
Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case
- Factual disputes defeat qualified immunity: When the parties disagree about what was said, how many orders were given, and how quickly someone complied, summary judgment is inappropriate.
- Retaliatory arrest claims survive if probable cause is disputed: If you can show your arrest lacked probable cause and followed protected speech, your First Amendment claim can go to a jury.
- Louisiana’s trespass statute has limits: Officers cannot use the criminal trespass statute to arrest someone standing on a public sidewalk — a principle that may apply to similar statutes in other states.
- Supervisory liability requires more than presence: If your claim is against a supervising officer who didn’t personally use force, you need to show a pattern of similar violations, not just a single incident.
- Psychological harm counts, but force must be excessive: Emotional distress from witnessing police violence can support a § 1983 claim, but the force applied to you personally must exceed what is objectively reasonable.
Key Takeaway
When police arrest you immediately after you make critical comments, and the legal basis for the arrest is thin — such as a trespass statute that may not apply to public sidewalks — factual disputes about probable cause will defeat the officer’s qualified immunity motion and allow both your false arrest and First Amendment retaliation claims to reach a jury.