Keenan v. Tejeda

What This Case Is About

Richard Keenan and Ray Przybylski reported a Bexar County constable’s possible wrongdoing to the district attorney and a television station. After the station aired a critical report, the constable retaliated: Keenan and Przybylski were subjected to a “felony” traffic stop with guns drawn, and Keenan was unsuccessfully prosecuted for “deadly conduct.” They sued under § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation. The Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants on the retaliation claim.

The Facts

In 1995, Keenan and Przybylski worked as bail bond agents and came across evidence of possible wrongdoing by Bexar County Constable Ruben Tejeda. They reported what they found to the Bexar County district attorney and provided information to a San Antonio television station, which aired a critical segment about the constable.

Shortly afterward, while driving, Keenan and Przybylski were subjected to a “felony” traffic stop by numerous officers with guns drawn — a response disproportionate to any traffic offense. Keenan was subsequently charged with “deadly conduct” for allegedly pointing a gun at the constable. The prosecution was unsuccessful. Keenan and Przybylski sued Constable Tejeda, Deputy Constable Joseph Martinez, and Bexar County.

What the Court Decided

The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs stated a viable First Amendment retaliation claim. To prove such a claim, a plaintiff must show (1) they engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant took an adverse action against them, and (3) the adverse action was motivated by the protected activity. Here, reporting government corruption to authorities and the media is clearly protected speech, the felony traffic stop and prosecution were adverse actions, and the temporal proximity between the TV report and the retaliation supported an inference of retaliatory motive.

The court held that fact questions precluded qualified immunity for Tejeda and Martinez. It was clearly established that government officials cannot retaliate against citizens for exercising First Amendment rights, and a reasonable officer would have known that orchestrating a retaliatory traffic stop and prosecution violated the Constitution.

However, the court affirmed summary judgment for Bexar County, finding no evidence that the county had a policy or custom of retaliating against citizens who reported constable misconduct.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Keenan v. Tejeda is a strong precedent for First Amendment retaliation claims:

• Protected activity: Reporting police misconduct to prosecutors, internal affairs, or the media is constitutionally protected speech. You cannot be punished for it.
• Adverse action: A “felony” traffic stop, arrest, or prosecution can all constitute adverse actions sufficient to support a retaliation claim.
• Temporal proximity: Close timing between your protected speech and the retaliatory act supports an inference of retaliatory motive.
• Qualified immunity: The right to be free from government retaliation for protected speech is clearly established. Officers cannot claim they didn’t know retaliation was unconstitutional.
• County liability: Even when individual officers retaliate, the municipality is not liable unless you can show a policy or custom of tolerating or encouraging such retaliation.

Key Takeaway

Citizens who report police misconduct to authorities or the media are exercising clearly established First Amendment rights — and officers who retaliate with traffic stops, arrests, or prosecutions cannot hide behind qualified immunity, though municipal liability still requires proof of a policy or custom.