Fraire v. City of Arlington
957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992)
Holding
A plainclothes officer who shot and killed a fleeing DWI suspect was entitled to qualified immunity where the suspect drove his truck at the officer, and the city was not liable under Monell absent specific evidence of a policy or custom causing the violation.
What This Case Is About
This is one of the Fifth Circuit’s important deadly force cases. A plainclothes Arlington police officer followed a suspected drunk driver, who pulled into a residential driveway. When the officer approached and identified himself, the driver backed out and drove his pickup truck at the officer, who shot and killed the driver. The family sued under § 1983, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity and that the city faced no Monell liability.
The Facts
One Sunday afternoon, Officer James Lowery, a warrants officer driving an unmarked car in plain clothes, observed Javier Fraire make a dangerously wide right turn from a convenience store parking lot, nearly colliding with oncoming traffic. Both Fraire and his passenger held open cans of beer. Lowery followed the pickup for about half a mile, observing Fraire swerving across lanes, and radioed for a marked patrol car.
Fraire suddenly turned onto a residential street and pulled into a driveway, apparently trying to make Lowery think he lived there. Lowery stopped across the street, displayed his badge, and identified himself as a police officer three times. He told Fraire to put the truck in park and turn off the ignition. Fraire said, “I am sorry, I didn’t mean to do it,” but instead of complying, he put the truck in reverse and backed out of the driveway.
What happened next is the crux of the case. Lowery said Fraire drove the truck directly at him. Lowery fired three shots, fatally wounding Fraire. The passenger, Rodriguez, gave differing accounts — initially telling police one version and later changing his story. The physical evidence, including the truck’s final resting position on the opposite side of the street, was consistent with the truck having been driven toward Lowery.
What the Court Decided
The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for both Officer Lowery and the City of Arlington. On qualified immunity, the court applied the Graham v. Connor objective reasonableness test and the Tennessee v. Garner deadly force framework.
The court found that a reasonable officer in Lowery’s position — facing a pickup truck being driven at him — would reasonably believe he faced a threat of serious physical harm. The use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The court emphasized that officers facing split-second decisions about deadly threats should not be judged with “20/20 vision of hindsight.” Importantly, the court rejected the argument that Lowery should have simply jumped out of the way rather than shooting — noting that the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to choose the least intrusive alternative.
On municipal liability, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to plead with sufficient particularity any official policy or custom of the City of Arlington that caused the alleged constitutional violation, as required by Monell.
Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case
Fraire is frequently cited in Fifth Circuit deadly force cases for two key propositions. First, when a suspect uses a vehicle as a weapon against an officer, deadly force is typically deemed reasonable. Second, officers are not required to retreat or choose alternative courses of action — the Fourth Amendment asks only whether the force used was objectively reasonable given the totality of circumstances, not whether the officer could have done something different.
The case also illustrates the high bar for Monell liability — vague allegations about city policies or training deficiencies, without specific evidence, will not survive summary judgment.
Key Takeaway
When a suspect drives a vehicle at a police officer, the officer’s use of deadly force will almost always be found objectively reasonable under Graham v. Connor. Courts in the Fifth Circuit consistently refuse to second-guess an officer’s split-second decision not to jump out of the way. If you’re challenging a vehicle-related shooting, you’ll need strong evidence that the officer was never actually in the vehicle’s path or that the threat had clearly passed before the officer fired.