Deville v. Marcantel

What This Case Is About

Deville v. Marcantel is a significant Fifth Circuit decision addressing false arrest, excessive force, and municipal liability claims arising from a small-town traffic stop that escalated dramatically. The court reversed summary judgment for the officers on false arrest and excessive force claims, finding genuine disputes of material fact, but affirmed dismissal of claims against the municipality.

The Facts

On August 5, 2005, Michell Deville, a 45-year-old registered nurse, was driving through the Village of Turkey Creek, Louisiana, with her two-year-old granddaughter. She had set her cruise control at 40 mph — the speed limit. Officer Dewayne Tarver pulled her over, claiming he clocked her going 50 mph.

Deville disputed the speed, calling the stop “bullshit.” Tarver asked her to step out of the vehicle; she refused, saying she hadn’t done anything wrong and expressing concern about her granddaughter. She rolled up her window and called her husband and family for help.

Chief of Police Louis Dale Marcantel, who was off-duty, arrived at the scene. According to Deville, Marcantel threatened to break her window, then began beating it with a heavy flashlight. Before she could finish rolling the window down, the glass broke. Officers pulled her from the vehicle and threw her against it, striking her abdomen. She was handcuffed and fell to the ground in pain.

Deville was taken to the sheriff’s office and then a hospital for treatment. She suffered contusions on both wrists, hand neuropathy requiring four surgeries, shoulder injuries, and cuts from broken glass. She missed 13 to 15 weeks of work.

The district attorney dropped all charges from the first arrest. Nearly nine months later — coinciding with Deville’s threat of litigation — Marcantel obtained an arrest warrant based on her hospital blood test showing prescription medications, charging her with DUI and controlled substance use near a minor. Those charges were also dropped.

What the Court Decided

The Fifth Circuit reached a mixed result:

False arrest (Tarver) — Reversed. Evidence permitted a jury to disbelieve Tarver’s claim he clocked Deville speeding. Tarver had a history of problematic arrests: the sheriff asked him to resign for excessive force, and the DA asked him to resign for filing a false marijuana charge. He failed to “lock in” the radar reading. A reasonable jury could find he lacked probable cause.

False arrest (Marcantel) — Affirmed. Marcantel reasonably relied on Tarver’s communication that Deville was speeding and refused to sign a ticket. Officers who rely on seemingly reliable information from fellow officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Excessive force — Reversed. Applying Graham v. Connor, the court found the force was disproportionate: Deville was stopped for a minor traffic violation; her resistance was at most passive (refusing to exit with her granddaughter); the off-duty chief smelled of alcohol; Marcantel quickly resorted to breaking the window and dragging her out rather than negotiating; and the handcuffs caused severe nerve damage requiring four surgeries. A reasonable officer would have known this force was excessive.

Second arrest — Affirmed. The arrest warrant from a justice of the peace broke the chain of causation for the false arrest claim. The malicious prosecution claim failed because the charges were dismissed by nolle prosse — a procedural dismissal, not a “bona fide termination” on the merits as required under Louisiana law.

Municipal liability — Affirmed. No evidence of a pattern of similar incidents before the Deville arrest. The Village was not deliberately indifferent.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Deville v. Marcantel is highly instructive:

• Officer credibility can be attacked. Prior false charges, forced resignations, and complaints against an officer can undermine the officer’s testimony about probable cause, creating genuine fact issues that defeat summary judgment.

• Passive resistance does not justify major force. Refusing to exit a vehicle during a minor traffic stop is passive resistance at most. Breaking windows and forcibly extracting a motorist — especially one with a child in the car — may be clearly excessive.

• Handcuff injuries matter. Injuries from handcuffs are sometimes dismissed as de minimis, but severe nerve damage requiring multiple surgeries crosses that threshold and supports excessive force claims.

• Reliance on fellow officers provides qualified immunity. Officers who act on information from seemingly reliable colleagues are generally protected, even if that information turns out to be false.

• Warrant breaks the causation chain. A valid warrant from a neutral magistrate generally insulates officers from false arrest liability for subsequent arrests.

Key Takeaway

Deville v. Marcantel demonstrates that even in a small-town traffic stop, officers must use proportionate force and must have actual probable cause. When an officer’s credibility is undermined by a history of false charges and forced resignations, courts will let a jury decide whether the officer fabricated the basis for the stop. Passive resistance to a minor traffic stop does not justify breaking windows, forcible extraction, and handcuffing that causes permanent injury.