Curran v. Aleshire

What This Case Is About

Curran v. Aleshire involves a school resource officer who allegedly slammed a 15-year-old student into walls during an encounter over a cell phone violation. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the officer’s interlocutory appeal, finding that the factual disputes identified by the district court were material to the qualified immunity analysis and could not be resolved on appeal.

The Facts

In September 2008, April Curran was a 15-year-old sophomore at Fontainebleau High School in Mandeville, Louisiana. She missed her bus to an arts school and used her cell phone on school grounds, violating school policy.

Teacher Leonard Abram saw Curran on her phone and told her to hand it over or go to the disciplinarian’s office. She refused, explaining she needed to leave campus. Abram called over Deputy Phillip Aleshire, the school’s resource officer.

The accounts diverge sharply from here:

Curran’s account: Aleshire began grabbing at her student ID card hanging on a lanyard around her neck. He yanked her head and neck, causing her to reflexively jerk back. Aleshire then “threw” her against a wall — allegedly headfirst — and handcuffed her. Later, during a walk to the disciplinarian’s office while she was cooperating, Aleshire “slammed” her into another wall hard enough to dislodge a cell phone hidden in her shirt.

Aleshire’s account: Curran fought him when he reached for her ID, smacking his hand and striking him across the head hard enough to knock off his glasses. He spun her against the wall to gain control. During the walk, she attempted to free herself and he placed her against the wall.

Curran suffered bruising on the back of her head and on her arms and wrists. She was arrested for battery of an officer, tried in juvenile court, and found guilty.

What the Court Decided

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The court explained that on interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity, it can review the materiality of factual disputes but not their genuineness. Aleshire’s arguments went to whether the fact disputes actually existed — not whether they mattered to the legal analysis.

First use of force: The district court found a factual dispute about whether Curran was still resisting when Aleshire slammed her into the wall. If enough time passed between her battery and his force, the force could constitute an “obvious case” of excessive force under Graham v. Connor. The right to be free from force after resistance ceases was clearly established.

Second use of force: Video and still photographs from surveillance cameras did not “blatantly contradict” Curran’s testimony under the Scott v. Harris standard. The footage was “inconclusive.” Under Curran’s version — handcuffed, subdued, not resisting — being slammed into a wall was an obvious excessive force violation.

The court cited Tolan v. Cotton for the principle that courts must not define the case’s context in a way that imports genuinely disputed facts.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Curran v. Aleshire addresses several important issues:

• Force after resistance ceases is clearly excessive. Once a suspect stops resisting — especially a minor who has been handcuffed — continued force is a clear constitutional violation. Officers do not get a free pass to punish someone for earlier resistance.

• The Heck doctrine has limits. Even though Curran was convicted of battery on an officer, this did not bar her excessive force claims. The conviction established the battery but did not establish that force used after the battery was reasonable.

• Video evidence must “blatantly contradict” testimony. Under Scott v. Harris, a plaintiff’s account is only rejected when video utterly discredits it. Inconclusive video does not override testimony.

• Interlocutory appeals cannot relitigate facts. Officers seeking qualified immunity on appeal cannot use the appeal to challenge whether a factual dispute is genuine — only whether it is material to the legal analysis.

Key Takeaway

Curran v. Aleshire shows that officers who use force against students in school settings are subject to the same Graham v. Connor standards as in any other context. The fact that a student may have earlier resisted does not give the officer carte blanche to use force once the resistance has ended. If you were subjected to force after you stopped resisting, your claim is on solid constitutional ground.