City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik

What Happened

James Praprotnik was an architect who worked for the City of St. Louis for fifteen years, rising to a management-level planning position. In 1980, his supervisor suspended him for 15 days for moonlighting without approval. Praprotnik appealed to the city’s Civil Service Commission, which found the penalty too harsh and reversed the suspension.

His supervisors were not happy. Praprotnik’s evaluations plummeted. One supervisor explicitly mentioned displeasure with his 1980 appeal. When a new mayor arrived and budget cuts hit, Praprotnik was transferred from the Community Development Agency to the Heritage and Urban Design Commission — where he was given unchallenging clerical work far below his qualifications. A year and a half later, he was laid off.

Praprotnik sued the City under § 1983, alleging his transfer and layoff were retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right to appeal. The jury found the City liable but exonerated the individual defendants. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, applying a test that treated any official whose decisions were “final” (not subjected to de novo review) as a municipal policymaker.

What the Court Decided

The Supreme Court reversed. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion established critical principles for identifying municipal policymakers under Monell:

1. State law controls: Identifying officials with “final policymaking authority” is a question of state and local law, not a question of fact for the jury. Federal courts must look to state statutes, city charters, and local ordinances to determine who has the authority to set policy.

2. “Final” means truly final: When a subordinate’s discretionary decisions are constrained by higher-level policies, or when those decisions are subject to review by authorized policymakers, the reviewers — not the subordinate — have final authority. Simply “going along” with a subordinate’s decisions does not constitute delegation.

3. Acquiescence ≠ delegation: The mere failure to investigate the basis of a subordinate’s decisions does not amount to delegating policymaking authority. This is especially true when the subordinate’s wrongful conduct stems from a “retaliatory motive or other unstated rationale” that the superior wouldn’t have known about.

Here, the City Charter gave policymaking authority to the Mayor, Aldermen, and the Civil Service Commission. No ordinance permitted retaliatory transfers. The Commission had repeatedly given Praprotnik at least partial relief on his appeals — hardly a sign that it endorsed retaliation.

What It Means in Practice

Praprotnik makes it harder for § 1983 plaintiffs to establish Monell liability. You can’t just show that a supervisor made an unconstitutional decision and that higher-ups didn’t second-guess it. You must identify a specific official with final policymaking authority under state or local law and show that that official adopted or ratified the unconstitutional policy.

The case drew an important line: if the city has a policy against the conduct (here, a merit-based employment system with an appeals process), isolated violations of that policy by subordinates do not create municipal liability — even if the subordinates get away with it.

However, the opinion also noted two paths that can establish liability despite subordinate misconduct:

• If a policymaker expressly approves a subordinate’s decision and its basis, that ratification is chargeable to the municipality
• If a custom or usage develops that is “so permanent and well settled” as to carry the force of law

How You Can Use It

• Identify the policymaker: Before trial, research your city’s charter, ordinances, and administrative code to identify who has final authority over the relevant area (e.g., the police chief for use-of-force policy, the city council for employment).
• Ratification theory: If a policymaker reviewed the specific unconstitutional conduct and approved it, cite Praprotnik: “If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality.” 485 U.S. at 127.
• Custom theory: If subordinates have engaged in a pattern of similar unconstitutional conduct that policymakers must have been aware of, the custom doctrine from Adickes and Monell still applies.
• Template: “Under City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988), [policymaker name], as the official with final policymaking authority over [area], ratified [subordinate]‘s unconstitutional conduct by [specific act of approval].”

How It Can Be Used Against You

• “Just a subordinate”: Defendants will argue that the officer or supervisor who injured you was merely a subordinate exercising discretion — not a final policymaker — and that the city bears no responsibility for isolated decisions by lower-level employees.
• Existence of an appeals process: If the city has a grievance or appeals mechanism (like the Civil Service Commission here), defendants will argue that the existence of review means the subordinate didn’t have “final” authority.
• No delegation: Defendants will argue that failing to monitor subordinates is not the same as delegating policy to them.

How to counter: Show that the formal policymaker either ratified the specific conduct, was aware of a pattern of similar violations and did nothing, or effectively delegated authority by never exercising any review. If the “appeals process” is a rubber stamp that always defers to the original decision, argue it’s review in name only.