Brown v. Tarrant County

What This Case Is About

Brown v. Tarrant County asks whether a civilly committed sexually violent predator can sue a county and its sheriff under § 1983 for failing to provide sex offender treatment during a brief period of confinement in the county jail. The Fifth Circuit said no — the sheriff was protected by qualified immunity, and the plaintiff failed to state a viable claim against the county.

The Facts

Clarence Brown was convicted in Texas state court of aggravated assault on a peace officer and three counts of sexual assault, receiving a fifteen-year prison sentence. Before his anticipated release, the State initiated civil commitment proceedings under the Texas Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). A jury found Brown to be a sexually violent predator, and a trial court ordered him civilly committed.

Under the version of the SVPA in effect at the time, civilly committed persons were required to reside in an approved residential facility and participate in treatment and supervision provided by the Texas Office of Violent Sex Offender Management (OVSOM). During a transition between facilities, Brown was held for approximately twenty days in Tarrant County Jail. During that twenty-day period, he did not receive sex offender treatment.

Brown filed a § 1983 lawsuit against Tarrant County and its former sheriff, Dee Anderson, claiming that the failure to provide treatment during his jail confinement violated his constitutional rights. This was Brown’s third appeal in the case, having previously litigated various challenges to the conditions of his civil confinement.

What the Court Decided

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on all counts.

First, the court found that Sheriff Anderson was entitled to qualified immunity. Even assuming that Brown had a constitutional right to treatment during his civil commitment, the law was not clearly established that a county sheriff had an obligation to provide specialized sex offender treatment during a brief twenty-day stay in a county jail — particularly when treatment was the statutory responsibility of a state agency (OVSOM), not the county.

Second, the court held that Brown failed to state a claim against Tarrant County itself. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Brown needed to identify an official policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation, and he failed to do so. The county was not the entity responsible for providing sex offender treatment under the SVPA — that obligation fell to OVSOM.

The court also upheld the district court’s denial of Brown’s motions to amend his complaint and to appoint counsel, finding no abuse of discretion.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Brown v. Tarrant County illustrates several important limitations on § 1983 claims:

• Qualified immunity’s “clearly established” requirement is a significant hurdle. Even if a constitutional right exists, the specific contours of that right must be sufficiently defined in existing case law for an officer to be on notice that their conduct is unlawful. Novel or unusual factual settings — like a short-term jail stay for a civilly committed person — may not satisfy this requirement.

• Municipal liability requires more than respondeat superior. You cannot sue a county simply because its employee allegedly violated your rights. You must identify an official policy or custom, and show that it was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.

• Statutory responsibility matters. When the legal obligation to act belongs to a state agency rather than a local government, the local government may not be liable for failing to perform that function.

Key Takeaway

If you are suing a county or its officials under § 1983, you must clearly identify which government entity bore the legal responsibility for the alleged constitutional violation. Where another agency — particularly a state agency — had the statutory duty to act, a county and its officials may escape liability, especially when qualified immunity shields individual defendants from claims based on unsettled law.