Brosseau v. Haugen

What This Case Is About

Officer Rochelle Brosseau shot Kenneth Haugen in the back as he attempted to flee from police in his Jeep Cherokee. Haugen sued under § 1983, alleging the shot constituted excessive force. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity because the case fell in the “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force” and existing law did not clearly establish that her conduct was unconstitutional.

The Facts

The day before the shooting, Glen Tamburello reported to Officer Brosseau that his former crime partner, Kenneth Haugen, had stolen tools from his shop. Brosseau learned there was a felony no-bail warrant out for Haugen’s arrest on drug and other charges.

The next morning, Haugen was spray-painting his Jeep Cherokee in his mother’s driveway. Tamburello and associate Matt Atwood drove to the house to confront Haugen. A fight broke out, and a neighbor called 911.

Brosseau responded and found Tamburello and Atwood trying to restrain Haugen. Haugen broke free, ran to his Jeep, and got in. Brosseau tried to stop him—she struck the driver’s side window with her handgun, eventually breaking it. She reached inside and tried to grab the keys. Haugen got the Jeep started and began to move.

Other people were in the immediate vicinity—Tamburello and Atwood were nearby, and a prior report indicated Haugen might be headed to a prior victim’s home. As the Jeep began to move forward, Brosseau shot Haugen once in the back through the rear window.

Haugen was injured but survived. He sued Brosseau under § 1983, alleging the shot violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.

What the Court Decided

The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the qualified immunity question and reversed the Ninth Circuit in a per curiam opinion.

The Court emphasized that the qualified immunity inquiry must be “undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” The Court acknowledged that Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner provide the general framework for excessive force analysis, but noted that this case was “far from the obvious one” where those general tests could “clearly establish” the answer without a body of directly relevant case law.

The Court examined the handful of cases from the circuits that were relevant to Brosseau’s specific situation—an officer shooting a suspect who was fleeing in a vehicle, with bystanders nearby. These cases showed:

• The area of law was one “in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case”
• Brosseau’s actions fell in the “‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force’”
• The existing case law “by no means ‘clearly established’ that her conduct violated the Fourth Amendment”

Because the law was not clearly established, Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity regardless of whether her conduct actually violated the Fourth Amendment.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Qualified immunity requires specificity. The Court reiterated that the clearly-established-law inquiry must be conducted at a high level of specificity—not based on general principles like “don’t use excessive force.” You must find prior cases with sufficiently similar facts to put the officer on notice that the specific conduct was unconstitutional.

The “hazy border” protects officers. When the use of force falls in an area where reasonable officers could disagree about whether the conduct was lawful, qualified immunity applies. This “hazy border” concept has become one of the most significant barriers for plaintiffs in excessive-force cases.

Vehicle flight cases are inherently uncertain. When a suspect attempts to flee in a vehicle, courts have recognized that the situation is inherently ambiguous—the vehicle poses a potential threat to bystanders, but shooting a fleeing driver also poses risks. This ambiguity often favors qualified immunity.

Deadly force against fleeing suspects. Garner prohibits deadly force against a fleeing suspect who poses no immediate threat. But when there are bystanders at risk or the suspect has a violent history, the calculus changes. Brosseau shows that this middle ground often falls within the “hazy border” where qualified immunity applies.

Key Takeaway

When an officer uses deadly force against a fleeing suspect in a situation where the case law does not clearly dictate the outcome, qualified immunity will protect the officer—even if the force ultimately violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court’s “hazy border” concept means that in ambiguous, fact-specific situations, plaintiffs must identify closely analogous precedent to overcome immunity. General principles from Graham and Garner alone are not enough.