Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown

What This Case Is About

Jill Brown was arrested by Deputy Stacy Burns of the Bryan County, Oklahoma, Sheriff’s Department, who allegedly used excessive force that caused her serious knee injury. Brown sued Bryan County under § 1983, arguing the county was liable because Sheriff Moore hired Burns without adequately reviewing his criminal background—a background that included guilty pleas to assault and battery and various driving offenses. The Supreme Court held that a single hiring decision can trigger municipal liability only under very narrow circumstances, requiring proof of deliberate indifference to a plainly obvious risk.

The Facts

Sheriff B.J. Moore of Bryan County, Oklahoma was the stipulated policymaker for the Sheriff’s Department. He hired his nephew’s son, Stacy Burns, as a reserve deputy. Burns had a troubling background: he had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions, assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public drunkenness.

Moore testified that he had obtained Burns’ driving and criminal records but had not closely reviewed either one before making the hiring decision. He acknowledged that if he had reviewed the records more carefully, the information might have given him pause.

Burns was dispatched to a pursuit that ended when the fleeing vehicle stopped. Burns approached the vehicle and used force to arrest Jill Brown, a passenger. According to Brown, Burns grabbed her and pulled her from the vehicle, causing serious injury to her knee that required multiple surgeries.

Brown sued Bryan County (not Burns individually) under § 1983, alleging the county was liable for her injuries because Sheriff Moore’s inadequate hiring screening constituted a “policy” under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The District Court denied the county’s motions for judgment as a matter of law, and the jury found for Brown. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

What the Court Decided

The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor.

The Court reaffirmed the foundational Monell principle: a municipality may not be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Instead, the plaintiff must identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that was the “moving force” behind the constitutional deprivation. This requires proof of both fault (culpability) and causation (a direct link between the municipal action and the injury).

The Court then addressed the specific challenge of basing municipal liability on a single hiring decision:

Culpability. Building on City of Canton v. Harris, the Court held that municipal liability for facially lawful actions (like hiring) requires more than negligence—it requires deliberate indifference. In the hiring context, this means the plaintiff must show that “adequate scrutiny of the applicant’s background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right.”

Causation. The Court emphasized the difficulty of proving causation in single-hiring-decision cases. Unlike failure-to-train cases (where Canton left open the possibility of liability based on a single violation in “narrow circumstances”), predicting the consequences of a single hiring decision is “far more difficult.” A criminal record of misdemeanors, standing alone, does not make it “plainly obvious” that the person will use excessive force.

The Court found that neither the District Court nor the Fifth Circuit properly tested whether Burns’ specific background made his use of excessive force a “plainly obvious consequence” of hiring him. His record of assault and battery, driving offenses, and public drunkenness, while troubling, did not establish the required link.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Single-incident municipal liability is extremely hard to prove. This case raised the bar for holding cities liable based on individual hiring decisions. You must show not just that the city was negligent in screening an officer’s background, but that the screening failure made the specific constitutional violation “plainly obvious.”

Deliberate indifference is the standard. For claims based on hiring, failure to train, or failure to supervise, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality acted with deliberate indifference—not mere negligence or even gross negligence.

Moving force causation is required. It is not enough to show the city did something wrong (like sloppy background checks). You must draw a direct line from the city’s action to the specific constitutional violation you suffered. This causal link is often the most challenging element.

Criminal background is not automatically disqualifying. A prior record of misdemeanor offenses does not automatically make it “plainly obvious” that a hire will violate someone’s rights. Plaintiffs need expert testimony or pattern evidence to connect the applicant’s specific background to the specific type of violation that occurred.

Key Takeaway

A municipality can be held liable for a single hiring decision only if the plaintiff proves that a reasonable review of the applicant’s background would make it plainly obvious that hiring that person would result in constitutional violations. This is a deliberately high bar—designed to ensure that cities are held responsible for deliberate choices, not for the unpredictable actions of every employee they hire.