Baker v. Putnal

What This Case Is About

During a large spring-break gathering at a Galveston beach, Sergeant Michael Putnal shot and killed Wendell Baker, Jr., who was sitting in the passenger seat of a parked truck. Putnal claimed he perceived a threat; Baker’s family maintained Baker was unarmed and made no threatening movement. The Fifth Circuit found genuine issues of material fact on the excessive force claim and reversed summary judgment on that issue while affirming the remainder of the district court’s judgment.

The Facts

On March 14, 1992, Sergeant Michael Putnal of the City of Galveston Police Department was on duty at R.A. Apffel Park, where a large crowd had gathered to celebrate spring recess. Fighting broke out, and two witnesses told Putnal that someone had entered the crowd with a pistol-gripped shotgun.

Minutes later, officers heard gunfire that sent the crowd running. Two people grabbed Putnal and pointed toward a red car, saying it contained the shooters. As Putnal approached the area, he saw Wendell Baker, Jr., and another man sitting in a truck parked on the beach. Baker was in the passenger seat. As Putnal neared the truck, Baker turned in Putnal’s direction. Putnal shot and killed him.

After the shooting, police recovered a Browning automatic .380 caliber pistol under the passenger seat of the truck. However, it was disputed whether Baker had reached for the weapon, displayed it, or was even aware of its presence.

Baker’s parents and the next friend of his minor son filed suit under § 1983, alleging that Putnal used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that Putnal’s superiors failed to provide adequate training and supervision, and that the City’s failure to train proximately caused the constitutional violations.

What the Court Decided

The Fifth Circuit treated the district court’s order as a grant of summary judgment (since the court had considered evidence outside the pleadings) and applied the appropriate standard of review.

On the excessive force claim against Putnal, the court reversed. Applying Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner, the court found genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment:

• Whether Baker made any threatening movement or gesture toward Putnal
• Whether Putnal could have reasonably perceived Baker as the person with the shotgun or as a shooter
• Whether the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances

The court emphasized that on summary judgment, all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Baker’s family). Under that view, an unarmed man was sitting in a parked truck and merely turned his head before being shot—a scenario that could support a finding of excessive force.

On the failure-to-train and supervisory liability claims, the court affirmed dismissal. The family did not present sufficient evidence of a pattern of similar violations or deliberate indifference in training to establish municipal liability.

On qualified immunity, the court held that qualified immunity did not shield Putnal at the summary judgment stage because the factual disputes went to the core of the reasonableness inquiry. If Baker made no threatening movement and was unarmed, then the use of deadly force would violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law under Garner and Graham.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Deadly force requires justification. Under Tennessee v. Garner, an officer may use deadly force only when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury. When the facts are disputed—particularly whether the suspect was armed or made a threatening movement—summary judgment is inappropriate.

Factual disputes defeat summary judgment. This case illustrates that when reasonable minds could differ about what happened—did the victim reach for a weapon or merely turn his head?—the case must go to a jury. Qualified immunity does not resolve factual disputes.

The “view from the officer’s perspective” has limits. While courts evaluate force from the perspective of a reasonable officer on scene, that perspective must be grounded in the actual facts, not the officer’s post-hoc characterization. When the plaintiff’s evidence contradicts the officer’s account, the plaintiff’s version controls at summary judgment.

Training and supervision claims require more. A single incident of deadly force, standing alone, is generally insufficient to establish failure to train or supervisory liability. Plaintiffs need evidence of a pattern or of deliberate indifference in training.

Key Takeaway

When an officer shoots and kills a person, and the facts about whether the victim posed a genuine threat are genuinely disputed, the case must go to a jury—qualified immunity cannot resolve the dispute at summary judgment. The use of deadly force against an unarmed person who made no threatening movement violates clearly established Fourth Amendment law, but establishing municipal liability for the shooting requires evidence beyond the single incident.