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Babb v. Dorman

33 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Decided: September 19, 1994
Docket: 92-1984

Holding

An officer who had arguable probable cause to arrest a motorist for public intoxication was entitled to qualified immunity, and the city was not liable under Monell absent evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.

What This Case Is About

William Babb was pulled over by Officer David Anthony Dorman of the Richardson, Texas, Police Department after Babb’s intoxicated passenger suddenly flung open the car door while the vehicle was moving. Despite Babb’s explanation that he had pulled over to assist his ill passenger, Dorman arrested him for public intoxication. Babb sued Dorman and the City of Richardson under § 1983, alleging false arrest and other constitutional violations. The Fifth Circuit held that Dorman had arguable probable cause for the arrest and was entitled to qualified immunity.

The Facts

During the early morning hours of May 27, 1990, Babb was driving eastbound on East Arapaho Road in Richardson, Texas, with an intoxicated female passenger. The passenger suddenly became ill and thrust open her door while the car was still moving. Babb checked behind him, pulled safely to the side of the road, and began to assist her.

Officer Dorman pulled up behind them in his squad car. He checked Babb’s driver’s license and questioned him about his activities that evening, including his alcohol consumption. Babb explained that he had been playing darts earlier and was forced to pull over when his passenger became ill. He acknowledged drinking approximately five beers over the course of the evening.

Dorman administered field sobriety tests. The results of those tests were disputed—Babb claimed he passed them; Dorman apparently concluded he did not. Dorman arrested Babb for public intoxication under Texas Penal Code § 42.08.

Babb was subsequently acquitted of the public intoxication charge. He then filed suit under § 1983, alleging that Dorman arrested him without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the City of Richardson was liable under Monell for maintaining unconstitutional policies or customs.

What the Court Decided

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court’s analysis proceeded on two tracks:

As to Officer Dorman, the court held he was entitled to qualified immunity. The relevant question was not whether Dorman actually had probable cause, but whether he had “arguable probable cause”—that is, whether a reasonable officer in his position could have believed probable cause existed to arrest Babb for public intoxication. Given that Babb admitted to drinking five beers, was encountered on the side of the road in the early morning hours, and the field sobriety test results were disputed, the court found that a reasonable officer could have concluded Babb was publicly intoxicated. This was sufficient for qualified immunity even though Babb was ultimately acquitted.

As to the City of Richardson, the court held that Babb failed to identify an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom under Monell. A single arrest by one officer does not establish the kind of persistent, widespread practice necessary to impose municipal liability. Nor did Babb point to an official policy that authorized or encouraged arrests without probable cause.

Why This Case Matters for Your § 1983 Case

Arguable probable cause defeats false arrest claims. Even when a plaintiff is ultimately acquitted—proving they were, in fact, innocent—the officer may still be protected by qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. Acquittal and lack of actual probable cause are different questions from arguable probable cause.

Admissions matter. Babb’s admission that he had consumed five beers provided the officer with facts that, combined with the circumstances (early morning, roadside stop, ill passenger), could support a reasonable belief in probable cause. What you say to officers during an encounter can be used to establish arguable probable cause.

Municipal liability requires a pattern. One officer’s arguably unconstitutional arrest is not enough to hold the city liable. Plaintiffs must show a policy or custom—either an official policy, a widespread practice, or a decision by a final policymaker—that caused the violation.

Field sobriety tests create factual disputes. When the results of field tests are subject to interpretation, courts are likely to find that the officer’s conclusion was at least arguable, making qualified immunity more likely.

Key Takeaway

An officer who arrests a motorist for public intoxication based on the motorist’s admitted alcohol consumption, the late-night circumstances, and disputed field sobriety test results has arguable probable cause and is entitled to qualified immunity—even if the motorist is later acquitted. To hold the city liable, a plaintiff must identify a specific municipal policy or widespread custom, not just a single incident of questionable policing.

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