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Giglio v. United States

405 U.S. 150 (1972)

Court: U.S. Supreme Court
Decided: February 24, 1972
Docket: 70-29
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Holding

The prosecution violates due process when it fails to disclose a material promise of leniency made to a key witness; impeachment evidence falls within Brady, and the government's disclosure duty is not avoided because one prosecutor did not know what another prosecutor promised.

What Happened

John Giglio was prosecuted for passing forged money orders. The government’s case depended heavily on testimony from a coconspirator, Taliento, who linked Giglio to the scheme.

After trial, it emerged that an assistant United States attorney had promised Taliento he would not be prosecuted if he testified before the grand jury and at trial. The prosecutor who actually tried the case told the jury that no such promise had been made. The trial prosecutor said he did not know about the earlier commitment.

That set up the key question: when the government fails to disclose a promise that could be used to impeach its main witness, does due process require a new trial?

What the Court Decided

The Supreme Court said yes. A promise of leniency to a key witness is impeachment evidence, and impeachment evidence falls within the disclosure rule announced in Brady v. Maryland.

The Court also rejected the idea that the government could escape responsibility because the trial prosecutor lacked personal knowledge. The prosecution is treated as one office for disclosure purposes. If one prosecutor made the promise, the government had a duty to disclose it.

Because Taliento’s credibility was central and the promise could have affected the jury’s view of his testimony, the nondisclosure required a new trial.

What It Means in Practice

Giglio matters because many wrongful prosecutions turn less on hidden physical evidence and more on hidden deals, incentives, or credibility problems. A witness who expects leniency, cash, dismissal of charges, or some other benefit has an obvious motive the defense is entitled to expose.

For Section 1983 plaintiffs, Giglio helps explain why hidden impeachment material can be just as serious as hidden exculpatory evidence. A case can turn on whether the jury trusted a cooperating witness, jailhouse informant, or complaining witness who had undisclosed incentives.

How You Can Use It

How It Can Be Used Against You

How to counter: Document the witness’s importance, identify exactly what benefit was offered, and show how disclosure would have changed cross-examination or the jury’s view of the case.

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